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ABSTRACT 
Looking for expansion of value chain activities abroad competitor’s offer to cooperate 
in particular activities can strengthen or damage the company business. The managers 
have to choose in which activities it is more beneficial to cooperate and where to 
compete with a competitor. The modern managerial science calls the phenomenon 
coopetition and choice between cooperation and coopetition in activities is called a 
mode. Both have been proved in many previous studies; however, it is still questionable 
how to handle coopetition in a better way for the company. Thus, the current study 
contributes to the topic from three points: explanation of the decision about coopetition 
through the elements, coopetitive modes distribution in value chain activities and 
coopetition in international activities. In other words, the study aims to identify 
elements that stay behind a decision of coopetition and its modes in upstream and 
downstream activities in cross-border value chain. Preliminary assumptions about the 
elements were gathered through the existing theories applied for coopetition, viz. the 
business network approach, game theory and the transaction cost approach. The cases of 
Russian companies are in focus of the empirical study. 
Then the case studies done in qualitative manner through interviews and were 
conducted to investigate the elements from real business situations. Later the elements 
were grouped according to coopetitive modes and theoretical approaches. Then the 
findings were compared with the preliminary assumptions from the theory. 
The findings uncovered diversified nature of elements. Some elements could be 
explained by more than one theoretical approach. Other elements affected more than 
one coopetitive mode. However, due to fusion of theoretical approaches most of the 
elements found in the case studies were identified and explained presenting 
comprehensive and versatile picture of coopetitive relationships in value chain 
activities. 
The paper sheds light on why coopetition emerges in cross-border value and how and 
why coopetitive modes are distributed between upstream and downstream activities. For 
managers it has the main application helping to understand not only own reasons for 
coopetition but intentions of competitor before embedment in the relationships. 
KEYWORDS: Coopetition, Elements of Coopetition, Cross-Border Value Chain, 
Upstream Activities, Downstream Activities  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
If you know your enemies and know yourself, you 
will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do 
not know your enemies but do know yourself, you 
will win one and lose one; if you do not know your 
enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every 
single battle.” 
(Sun Tzu “The Art of War” 6th century BC) 
 
1.1. Research background 
For many years managerial theories have stated that the only possible relationship with 
a competitor is competition (Porter 1985, Barney 1986). But if a competitor comes with 
an offer to cooperate, what will be hidden behind? Is it a good will and sincere request 
for help or opportunistic plan? The phenomenon of simultaneous coexistence of 
cooperation and competition between two competitors is called coopetition (Bengtsson 
& Kock 2000) and drew attention of the academic society relatively recently. 
Coopetition as a phenomenon takes different forms (Padula & Dagnino 2007), has been 
classified in variety of ways (discussion in Yami et al. 2010), studied in different levels 
(discussion in Bengttsson, Eriksson & Wincent 2010). However, questions “What stays 
behind the decision of coopetition?” and “What are the reasons for coopetitive 
relationships in value chain activities?” examined relatively modest. The current study 
is targeting to contribute to the mentioned gap with investigating the theoretical 
premises of the existing approaches looking for the elements influencing coopetition 
and then apply them for case studies. Furthermore, the elements will be classified 
according to their influence on degree of cooperation and coopetition in value chain 
activities.  
Such theoretical premises firstly appeared in an attempt to build the models for practical 
application with possibility to evaluate “coopetitive advantage”, analyze its success and 
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manage coopetitive relationships. Coopetition is often explained from the position of 
existing theories, i.e. business network approach (Bengtsson & Kock 2000; Hertz & 
Mattsson 2004), game theory (Brandenburger & Nalebuff 1995, Nalebuff &  
Brandenburger 1997; Padula & Dagnino 2007), transaction cost approach (Hill 1990; 
Park & Russo 1996), resource based view (Lado et al. 1997; Schiavone & Simoni 
2011), socioeconomics (Lado et al. 1997). However, the approaches when they are 
applied solely, present narrow view of such complex phenomenon as coopetition. Thus, 
the current study uses the fusion of approaches including the business network 
approach, game theory and the transaction cost approach in search for more coherent 
explanation of coopetition. 
Furthermore, there are a number of studies with the focus on the elements influencing 
coopetitive relationships. They can be divided into two main streams. One investigates 
the coopetitive relationships holistically perceiving a company or even a group of 
companies as a unit of study (i.e. Bengtsson & Kock 2000; Kock, Nisuls, & Söderqvist 
2010; Gimeno 2004; Lado et al. 1997). The other stream concentrates on particular 
activities of value chain that fall under coopetitive relationships (i.e. Arranz & Arroyabe 
2008; Mention 2011; Kotzab & Teller 2003; Rusko 2011). The current study steps aside 
from both groups as its interest lies in the whole value chain and coopetition inside it. It 
is more than investigation of the particular activities and deeper then perception of a 
company as a solid entity, here the value chain is one of the core concepts 
disaggregating the company and aggregating the activities.  
The value chain for the current study is assumed in a classical definition made by Porter 
(1985) as activities gathered by the company in the process to create value.  The special 
interest of this study was found in cross-border value chain when activities are alocated 
in different countries. Nowadays almost no company operates within borders of only 
one country; there is a pattern of foreign suppliers, customers or both. Thus, the 
companies are challenged with a quest of activities allocation seeking for foreign market 
expansion or cost efficiency in production. The cooperation with a competitor abroad 
should be definitely considered as one of the options. It makes managerial choice 
whether to compete or cooperate in a particular activity broader but more challenging. 
In this case managers have to solve not only a conundrum what is in competitor’s mind 
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in terms of business strategy, but also  predict how such cooperation will benefit or not 
from local custom, legislation and other instances that are beyond of  managerial control 
and different from home ones. Assembling activities in a solid value chain the company 
gets a number of activities that are involved in dyadic cooperative relationships and in 
competitive ones. Further in the paper interconnection between types of relationships 
(cooperative, competitive or both) in particular value chain activities is defined. Such 
variety of relationships are classified in coopetitive modes assessing degree of 
cooperation and competition in different activities.  
There are studies that grew to the theoretical approaches investigating evolution of 
company international expansion and reasoning the selection of particular activities for 
internationalization and operation modes (i.e. the eclectic paradigm by Dunning (2000), 
business network approach by Johanson and Mattsson (1988), international new 
ventures by Oviatt and Dougall (1994)). Moreover, from the assumption that the 
countries differ in terms of economic, politic, socio-cultural and other conditions, 
transferability of local value chain activities abroad becomes questionable. Hence, the 
bunch of studies is dedicated to possibility of application and elements influencing the 
transition of the value chain activities abroad to hostile environment (see, for example, 
Anderson 2009; Jacobides 2008). Consequently, expansion of the value chain activities 
abroad present abundant topic for research and obviously rewarded with the interest 
from practitioners due to its routine and vital application for business. These 
assumptions defined the narrow scope of the study within value chain among many 
issues associated with the coopetitive relationships.  
The emperical investigation is conducted in form of two case studies that took place in 
Russian companies expanding abroad. The choice of the country for the study was done 
due to a number of reasons. Firstly, due to its long closeness during the communist 
governance and planned economy, nowadays there is lack of any studies dedicated to 
management (Puffer & McCarthy 2011) including coopetition. However, Hofstede’s 
study of cultural dimensions revealed considerable difference between Russia and 
Western countries (Naumov & Puffer 2000). Meanwhile, today Russia has a significant 
economical power and potential to become important player in the global market. 
However, among BRIC countries Russia gets the least attention from academic research 
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(Puffer & McCarthy 2011). Thus, despite remained bias to secrecy and low trust in 
Russia the studies of Russian management have practical interest for business in terms 
of expansion to this promising and growing market. Then, logic of small open 
economies that is popular in European studies of internationalization (i.e. Gabrielsson et 
al. 2008; Laanti, McDougall & Baume 2009; Luostarinen & Gabrielsson 2006) is barely 
applicable due to size of the country. Here the question of internationalization does not 
appear among first vital managerial issues due to big internal market and internal 
diversity. Furthermore, no studies conducted in Russia were found on the topic of 
coopetition. Hence, it is even more urgent to research Russian companies and their 
coopetitive ways of doing business.  
Gathering together all the propositions mentioned above the current study focuses on 
coopetitive relationships between competitors through lenses of the business network 
approach, game theory and the transaction cost approach while the competitors build 
their cross-border value chain. The empirical part of the study applied the built 
theoretical framework for Russian companies. Next in the chapter the statement of the 
research purpose and structure of the study are offered. 
 
1.2. The purpose of the study  
There is a wide field for the research and this thesis is focused on looking at one of the 
issues, viz. elements of generating coopetitive relationships applied for cross-border 
value chain. With the help of existing studies the work challenges to fill the mentioned 
gap through building an adequate framework of relationship between decision-making 
elements and coopetitive modes in cross-border value chain. 
Thus, the purpose of the study is to investigate elements defining degree of cooperation 
and competition in cross-border value chain from the perspective of a single company 
participating in coopetition. 
The purpose makes a claim to develop firstly the theoretical perspective. Its focus lies 
on investigating propositions in the existing literature regarding elements of coopetition 
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and possible combination of cooperative and competitive relationships in value chain. 
Hence, the theoretical research questions are: 
How is cross-border value chain influenced by coopetition and what types of 
coopetition modes proposed in the previous literature?  
How do existing theoretical approaches explain the elements of coopetition between 
competitors in the expansion of company’s activities abroad and building cross-border 
value chain? 
Based on gathered existing theory the conceptual framework of relationships beteen 
elements and coopetition modes is created. Further, the empirical case study will take 
place with the aim of developing the framework. Thus, the empirical research questions 
are: 
Why does the company enter coopetitive relations when expanding activities abroad?  
What and why particular activities are selected for combination of competition and 
cooperation in cross-border value chain?  
Afterwards to fulfill the purpose of the study, the theoretical conceptual framework is 
supplemented with findings from the case study. It will provide managerial applications 
to the ideas from theoretical part that suitable for future use in practice.  
 
1.3. Structure of the study 
The study consists of six chapters and their brief description is presented next. 
Additionally the structure is drawn in Figure 1. 
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1. Introduction
2-3. Overview of central 
concepts & 
Theoretical framework
4. Methodology
5. Empirical findings
6. Conclusions
 
Figure 1. The structure of the study. 
The first chapter gives understanding about urgency of the coopetition phenomenon. It 
elaborates the place of the current paper among other studies uncovering a research gap 
in a broad field of academic works dedicated to coopetition. Consequently, the purpose 
of the study is to enrich knowledge regarding elements influencing degree of 
coopetition and cooperation. It is narrowed even further focusing not only on the 
companies as a whole but on their value chains and particular activities that are 
supposed to have either coopetitive or cooperative nature. 
The second chapter brings order in the concept of value chain in terms of the current 
research. It starts with definition of value creation that is a core inducement for the 
value chain concept. Moreover value chain is investigated in terms of activity expansion 
to the foreign markets. Finally, the correlation between value chain and coopetition is 
under discussion. That gives basis for definition of the coopetitive modes that are one of 
the central elements in the current study. 
The third chapter is dedicated to the second central element of the study. It observes 
main contributions for classification of the elements influencing coopetitive modes. 
Three approaches have been selected for building the theoretical framework, viz. the 
business network approach, game theory and the transaction cost approach. Separate 
sub-chapters are dedicated to every approach. They contain approach understanding 
applied for coopetition with the focus on elements shaping coopetitive relations. In the 
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end of the chapter the summary explains necessity of approach fusion and based on it 
the theoretical framework of the study is depicted. 
The forth chapter clarifies methodology of the work; it justifies choice of semi-
deduction as the research logic, qualitative approach for data analysis case study as 
strategy and semi-structured interviews and method to conduct the empirical part of the 
study. Furthermore, it explains data collection and analysis accompanied with their 
assess in terms of validity and reliability.   
The fifth chapter uncovers the empirical part of the study. It includes description of the 
cases with company backgrounds. Then the findings are presented and analyzed. Based 
on the analysis the theoretical framework is developed.  
The sixth chapter closes the study. Conclusions and implications for research and 
practice are there. They are complemented with limitations and suggestions for the 
further research. 
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2. CROSS-BORDER VALUE CHAIN AND COOPETITION 
 
2.1. Understanding the value creation 
The value creation is a fundamental concept in managerial science, however due to 
extensive application there is still no common definition of value (Woodruff 1997) or 
agreement on how it is created and by whom. For example, Bowman and Ambrosini 
(2000) perceive value as a satisfaction of customer needs but Babin and James (2010) 
contradict claiming that satisfaction does not play a significant role in value creation. 
The most common conclusion from variety of the approaches is that the value creation 
is a source of competitive advantage (Woodruff 1997). However, there is still 
uncertainty around the subject and object of value creation, viz. organization, customer 
or both (Grönroos 2008, Vargo & Lusch 2004). The customer value is opposed to the 
value of organization (Woodruff 1997). The former consider customer wishes and 
believes while using the product. The latter promotes delivery of superior customer 
value that increases value of the organization. This work adopts customer value concept 
as organizational value is seen as return and a consequence of customer value creation 
after exchange. Thus, the concept of customer value supports required level of 
reasoning.  
Payne and Holt (2001) issued a comprehensive literature review on customer value 
creation. They highlighted four streams that influenced research on value creation the 
most: (1) consumer values and consumer value; (2) the augmented product; (4) 
customer satisfaction and service quality; and (4) the value chain. The first three 
approaches discuss about customer value as a whole and root it in customer’s wishes 
and believes without focus on how an organization can achieve it. At the same time, the 
value chain approach looks inside the organization and how value is created internally 
and delivered to the customer that is in the purpose of the current study. So the value 
chain concept is adopted for further implication. In this case “value” definition is used 
as it was proposed in the original concept by Porter:  
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“…value is the amount buyers are willing to pay for what firm provides 
them. Value is measured by total revenue, can sell. A firm is profitable if the 
value it commands exceeds the costs involved in creating product.” (Porter 
1985: 38)  
Thus, the value is perceived in its simplest economic form and used as a final result of 
company’s activities in an attempt to create the product that the customer desires. For 
the current study it is considered as a given concept and its necessity for company 
sustainability is not questioned. The main role is assigned for the pre-requisite of value 
creation, the value chain concept as it is seen as the main target where coopetitive 
relations take place. Next the concept is explained and analyzed.  
 
2.2. Value chain 
The value chain is not the new phenomenon. Smith’s task specification, Tailor’s 
scientific management and later Toyota’s “just-in-time” approaches claimed labor 
division as a determinant of production efficiency (Kaplinsky & Morris 2000). Finally, 
Porter (1985) gathered the existing concepts and created value chain approach based on 
“business systems” developed by  McKinsey. He defined that:  
“The value chain disaggregates a firm into its strategically relevant activities 
in order to understand the behavior of costs and the existing and potential 
source of differentiation.” (Porter 1985: 33).  
Porter (1985: 39 - 43) highlighted nine groups of activities and aggregated them into 
two categories: primary and support. The primary activities have technological nature 
and involved in physical conversion of raw material to the product and delivery it to the 
customer. They include inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and 
sales and service. The support activities have more strategic nature and sustain the 
primary activities. They comprise firm infrastructure, human resource management, 
technology development and procurement. The graphic interpretation of the value chain 
is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Porter's value chain. 
The statement from Chapter 2.1 claims that value creation is a source of competitive 
advantage so it can be interpreted that value creation comes from excellent performance 
of particular value chain activities. Thus, value chain analysis helped to evaluate and 
optimize activity performance in the company in an attempt to maximize value (McPhee 
& Wheeler 2006). 
Such analysis discovers the weak and strong activities (Porter 1985: 55). It helps to tune 
value chain and decide about particular activities that should be kept in-house due to 
their excellent performance. Also the analysis uncover possible activities for outsource 
to suppliers or even customers. Hence, in an attempt of value maximization a company 
concentrates on a limited number of activities and outsources the rest (Prahalad & 
Hamel 1990). 
Despite Porter’s confidence that his concept of the value chain is universally applicable 
(Porter 1985: 40) some criticism appeared within time. The approach was accused in 
limited applicability for service value chains where service transition through activities 
is difficult to codify (Prajogo, McDermott & Goh, 2008). To answer this challenge 
Stabel and Fjelstadt (1998) proposed service value chain (value shop) where value is 
delivered through resolution of customer problems or bringing desired changes in the 
system. The model offers loop the chain, so problem-solution awakes new problem-
solving process. Moreover, considering increasing servization of industries and shift 
towards networking Norman and Romirez (1993) criticized Porter’s approach for being 
too company-centric. In other words, the managers focused too much on possible 
improvement of activities but not on actual customer values and value for the whole 
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system. The possibility of joint effort on value creation through relations and 
networking stood aside of Porter’s value chain. Thus, Norman and Romirez (1993) 
offered “value constellation” instead of value chain. McPhee and Wheeler (2006) 
highlighted that intangible elements among company’s activities became nowadays 
more significant in value creation. Then they modified the original value chain stressing 
importance of networking and reputation. 
In an attempt to generalize all the criticism it is obvious that Porter’s value chain suffers 
from own limitation within one company while network relationships “supplier-
customer” become more complicated and tangled. It is insignificant to consider value 
chain of one particular company when most of the activities are outsourced and they 
belong at the same time to value chains of other suppliers or customers. Nevertheless, 
from the single company perspective which is in the focus of the current research the 
holistic value chain is perceived more appropriate. There full transformation of one 
particular product from raw material or components to the final goods delivered to 
customer takes place. It has only one point of completed product (will be described in 
the next paragraph).  Thus, from a single company perspective, this company is the 
owner of the chain, and the rest entities participating in the chain are either suppliers or 
customers.   
Following the holistic value chain, the product transformation from raw material to 
customer goods is worth to imagine as a vertical flow (see Figure 3). On the top there 
are a number of streams mentioning supply of raw materials and components that come 
from different sources both in-house and outsourced. In fact, they are still the same 
value added activities mentioned in Porter’s value chain but regrouped. They are 
production-oriented and called upstream activities.  The streams of activities meet 
together in the point when the physical transformation of the product is completed. 
Further, the flow continues down but the streams begin separating. The streams of 
activities now represent different channels of distribution to different markets.  These 
are marketing-oriented or downstream activities. 
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Point of completed 
product
Upstream / product-oriented
Activities (supply)
Downstream / marketing-oriented 
Activities (distribution)
Raw materials and components
Customer goods
Outsourced activities
In-house activities
 
Figure 3. Holistic value chain of product transformation with upstream and downstream 
activities. 
Applying the value chain concept to the current study upstream/downstream activity 
division is seen as appropriate degree of disaggregation. Considering that value chain 
covers the whole production-distribution cycle, such division provides necessary level 
of unification. Porter (1985: 36) mentioned that every value chain is unique as it is a 
source of competitive advantage. Thus, activities investigated separately are not suitable 
for comparison. Consequently, aggregation of the activities in groups is a necessary 
limitation to answer the research questions. Nonetheless, such measures will not affect 
quality of the study as competitive advantage is not in the focus of the study. 
Furthermore, focusing on upstream and downstream activities of the value chain this 
work will contribute to existing studies in coopetition with similar disaggregation 
principle of the value chain, viz. Rusko (2011), Bengtsson and Kock (2000), Nalebuff 
and Brandenburger (1997), Walley (2007: 17 for comprehensive list of studies). 
Particularly coopetition in value chain is discussed in next Chapter 2.4. But before it 
there is a necessity to give credits to the cross-border value chain as an emergent 
extension of the value chain concept. 
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2.3. Cross-border value chain 
Globalization forces push companies to expand their operations abroad. It is critical 
decision for company success and profitability but it holds dilemma, what activities in 
the value chain brings more value (Prajogo et al. 2008) and what activities are better to 
internationalize (Sainio et al. 2011). Additionally, considering cultural differences 
worldwide managers meet a challenge deciding possible level of activity localization 
(Jacobides 2008, Anderson 2009).  From the value chain perspective the managers look 
for best combination of activities to maximize the value creation. In case of 
internationalization the company is not limited with national borders and can benefit 
from country specific advantages (low-cost labor, advanced R&D, etc.) (Gabrielsson et 
al. 2008). Thus, variations of activity allocation differ from highly concentrated value 
chain that is tied to one country, till highly dispersed value chain, where every activity 
is performed in different locations (Porter 1986). Still managers must find the balance 
between these two extremes. 
Porter (1986: 23) argued that downstream activities were more country specific and 
required more adaptation to the local market. At the same time, once assimilated in the 
local market, downstream activities create entry barriers. The upstream activities are 
mostly standardized and the company creates value from the economy of scale while 
internationalizing. However, this is not a universal pattern but an industry and company 
dependent issue. Barlett (1986) supported the assumption and proposed to classify 
companies’ strategies of internationalization in a two-dimensional model of Global 
coordination/National Responsiveness. Thus, the decision regarding activities allocation 
and the level of their localization depend on the type of the strategy adopted by the 
company. Furthermore, Welsh et al. (2007: 430) followed the company 
internationalization path and discovered that selection of activities for 
internationalization depends on the stage of internationalization. Then Gabrielsson et al. 
(2008) added that selection of the activities for abroad expansion depended also on the 
stage of the industry life cycle.  
From the above it is clear that during internationalization the value chain may require 
adaptation to the host country especially in downstream activities. Expanding abroad 
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the company cannot take for granted that excellent performance in some value chain 
activities will provide the same value for customers in the foreign market (Anderson 
2009). There is also a contradict approach that internationalizing firm is able to enforce 
changes in the alien environment to shape its suitability for the existing home value 
chain (Jacobides 2008,  Gabrielsson et al. 2008: 10). Hence, successful establishment of 
the cross border value chain depends much on understanding of possible differences 
between countries and confidence in possibility to change the environment.  
Despite the variety of attempts there is still no common and universal solution how to 
establish cross-border value chain. The managers have to balance optimization and 
coordination (Porter 1985: 48) through trade-offs of locations and levels of localization 
bearing in mind the maximization of the total value creation. One of the most important 
decisions is “make-or-buy”, could be also perceived as “compete-or-cooperate” in the 
current study. It is especially urgent for the foreign hostile market, where players and 
rules of the game vary from the home market, when excellent performance of value 
chain activities in standardized way become questionable. Shaping cross-border value 
chain the managers have to decide about their partners and competitors in particular 
activities in the foreign market or choose a competitor for cooperation. Thus, the current 
study claims to investigate the elements influencing such decisions. Especially it is 
focused on cases of simultaneous cooperation and competition in value chain. The logic 
of interaction between these two phenomena is explained in the next chapter.  
 
2.4. Value chain and coopetition 
The value chain and coopetition are two key concepts in the currents study. The former 
has been explained above. Now to show how value chain is bound to coopetition it is 
necessary firstly to define the coopetition itself, how it is appeared in managerial studies 
and what it is characterized in the current study.  
Previously two types of interactions, viz competition and cooperation, were mainly 
recognized in traditional managerial theories. Competition was identified earlier and 
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defined as rivalry between two firms acting independently within industry with the 
purpose to provide the customer with the better offer (Bengtsson & Kock 2000). 
Cooperation drew academic attention later and expressed mostly in strategic alliances in 
form of resource combination and learning facilitation to compete with the third party 
(Bengtsson & Kock 2000). Interestingly the classical approach of competition is 
considered to be “a driving force for commercial activity” and the most beneficial for 
innovativeness and for the customer as it forces prices down and enlarges product 
assortment (Walley 2007: 13). This became later a basis for creation of the competitive 
policies and legislation, i.e. antitrust (Barney 1986). At the same time, the cooperation 
was considered as collision hampering competition and threatening free trade (Walley 
2007). Hence, the approaches are clearly located on the opposite sites of intercompany 
interactions and for a long time there was a gap in between.  
Nowadays many companies consider competition and cooperation as daily routine even 
though they are dichotomous. At first sight, co-existence of competition and 
cooperation in company relationships portfolio is apparent as there are different kinds of 
interactions, viz. rivalry with competitors and collaboration with partners. However, 
when these contradictory interactions are found in relationships between two entities, 
the challenge is obvious: theory of competition and cooperation applying separately 
cannot answer how to balance the strategy to benefit from them. The established 
theories are too narrow to describe the interactions coherently and a new approach is 
required. The solution was found in coopetition and defined as simultaneous co-
existence of competitive and cooperative relationships between entities (Bengtsson & 
Kock 2000).  
The previous studies created a grounded basis to see the coopetition as a real strategic 
alternative in business besides competition and cooperation. Competition sees 
competitive advantage in risk-taking innovativeness and cooperation looks for benefits 
in access to rare resources. It can be assumed that the company may practice both 
strategies and simultaneously (Bengtsson & Kock 2000). As a prove of the above 
statement there are enough cases investigating existence of the coopetition in particular 
companies and industries, viz. newspapers, training, tourism, retailing, financial 
services, port management, school education, and biotechnology (Walley 2007) car 
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industry, natural health care products (Tidström 2006), and even Formula-1 
Championship (Solitander 2011). Additionally daily business life brings new examples 
of the phenomenon, viz. mutual suits of Apple and Samsung being competitors in the 
segment of tablet PC and smartphones and partners in spare parts supply (Yang 2011). 
Despite the above, mostly contribution to the topic lies in the field of value creation and 
capture (i.e. Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009, Dagnino & Mariani 2010; Dagnino 
& Padula 2002, Lado et al. 1997) or tension between cooperation and competition 
within relationships between two or more entities (i.e. Das & Teng 2000; Tidström 
2006; Solitander 2011). Also there are studies with focus on particular value chain 
activities, i.e. R&D (Arranz & Arroyabe 2008), innovations (Mention 2011), supply 
chain (Kotzab and Teller. 2003) or strategic moves between activities (Rusko 2011). 
However, among studies of coopetition there is lack of examples that are focused on 
value chain and sequence of its activities. 
In the studies regarding influence of coopetition on value chain there is frequent opinion 
that on the intercompany level the upstream activities are under influence of cooperation 
forces, while downstream activities have competing nature (i.e. Bengtsson & Kock 
2000, Nalebuff & Brandenburger 1997). Additionally, value chain is seen linearly, 
hence, simultaneous competition and cooperation are barely possible in one particular 
specific activity. It creates tensions due to different logic of harmonic cooperation  and 
conflicting competition (Bengtsson & Kock 2000: 412). 
However, it can be assumed that relationships in the value chain containing any 
international activities are not so linear and obvious. Instantly following the global 
customer, the supplier may use partnership agreements but not establishment of a 
wholly own subsidiaries in foreign markets. Then, for example (see Figure 4), the 
partner (company B) of company A for particular activities in warehousing abroad 
(Market B) may be one of the rivals at the same activities in home or any other foreign 
markets (Market A). In this case simultaneous competition and cooperation can be seen 
in the same activities.  
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                Warehouse 1                 Warehouse 2
          No warehouse                 Warehouse 3
Market A
Market B
Company A Company B
Competition between 
warehouses 1&2
Cooperation for using 
warehouse 3
 
Figure 4. Example of simultaneous cooperation and competition in warehousing 
activity in case of cross-border value chain. 
From the above, Luo (2007: 130) argues that international competition appears in 
“multi-points (multiple nations and multiple products) and via multi-units (multiple 
subsidiaries and divisions)”. As opposed to Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1997) and 
Begtsson and Kock (2000) rivalry actions may take place for input (upstream activities) 
and for output (downstream activities) while cooperation occurs in cooperative alliance 
focused on one of value chain activities in particular markets and with particular 
products as well as with a purpose to create noticeable power for interaction with 
external actors, viz. governments, NGOs (Luo 2007). Thus, simultaneous competition 
and cooperation between multinational companies take place in any activities without 
limitations but based on rationality of management. 
Then it is a logical question what the elements are behind the choice between 
competition or cooperation in particular value chain activities: weak resource base, 
absence of local experience and relations or something else. The second issue is how to 
manage such multifaceted relationships in beneficial manner. However, before 
discovering them there is one more topic should be clarified. This is the definition of 
coopetitive modes that is applied in the current study to identify degree of cooperation 
and competition in cross-border activities. It is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
2.5. Coopetition modes 
As it was defined above coopetition is about cooperation and competition in 
relationships between entities, precisely companies in the current study. Hence, 
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considering this mixture it is worth to talk about degree of both strategies in 
relationships. For example, Bengtsson and  Kock (2000)  and Kock et al (2010) pointed 
out strong cooperation dominated relation, weak cooperation dominated relation and 
equal relation. Luo (2007) proposed the frameworks of coopetition intensity and 
diversity. Osarenkhoe (2010) studied dynamics of relationships that passes through 
phases of competition, cooperation collaboration and coopetition. All mentioned  
approaches appeared from investigating the relations as aggregated result of interactions 
between companies.  
However, disaggregating relationships back to particular activities in value chain pure 
forms of cooperation and competition as well as examples of coopetition can be found 
in particular activities. Hence, it is possible to propose the classification of relationships 
in value chain activities with four choices: no relationships, cooperation, competition 
and coopetition (see Figure 5). Further, in the paper such choices are called coopetitive 
modes or modes of coopetition. Thereby, every activity of company’s value chain 
concerning the competitor can be located in one of four modes. 
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Figure 5. Coopetitive modes. 
Definitely absence of relationships is of no interest for the current study so the 
classification can be aligned accordingly as it is shown in Figure 6. 
29 
Value                                                     chain
Competition
Cooperation
Coopetition 
(Competition and Cooperation)
 
Figure 6. Coopetitive modes modified for the study. 
 Thereby, three modes express presence or absence of competition or cooperation in 
particular value chain activities and this is the measurement of degree of cooperation 
and competition for the current study. Such discrete approach is crucial due to 
explorative nature of the study and absence of continuous scale to measure coopetitive 
mode strength.  
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3. THEORETICAL FOCI FOR THE ELEMENTS OF 
COOPETITION 
 
It has been mentioned above that coopetition appeared from combination of competition 
and cooperation. In fact, it means that there is nothing new in coopetition in terms of 
seeing the sense of business interactions, but novelty is in combination of the 
approaches that considered before contradictory and not combinable. Thus, it can be 
proposed that existing theories can explain the phenomenon of coopetition and there are 
many theoretical and empirical contributions to it (Walley 2007). The most common 
theories used for explanation of different aspects of coopetition are game theory, the 
business network approach, the resource-based view and the transaction cost approach. 
Since the emergence of interest to the coopetition single-approach studies were 
widespread, i.e. the business network approach in Bengtsson and Kock (2000), Hertz 
and Mattsson (2004), game theory in Brandenburger and  Nalebuff (1995), Dong-Wook 
(2003), Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2009), transaction cost approach in Hill 
(1990), Park and Russo (1996). However, coopetition has complex nature due to fusion 
of two classical concepts and also because of its multi-level structure: individual, 
organization, mutual interorganizational and network (Bengtsson, Eriksson, Wincent 
2010: 23 - 25). Hence, utilization of only one single theory may represent one-side 
narrow view of the phenomenon. Therefore, the synthesis of approaches became 
popular in an attempt to create more coherent and solid understanding of the 
coopetition, i.e. Lado et al. (1997), Quintana-García Benavides-Velasco (2004), 
Schiavone and Simoni (2011). The theoretical framework for the current study includes 
also a combination of the approaches. 
The selected approaches are game theory, the business network approach and the 
transaction cost approach (Figure 7). Firstly, the business network approach is used as it 
highlights inevitable cooperation between all actors in the network independently of 
their role and position (Hertz & Mattson 2004). Secondly, game theory was picked due 
to its explanation of the situations when coopetition is more beneficial in relationships 
between companies (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995). Finally, the transaction cost 
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approach explains trade-offs between cooperation and competition with competitors and 
shows ambiguity of coopetition in terms of opportunistic risks (Hill 1990). 
 
Figure 7. Combination of the theoretical approaches used in the study. 
The proposed combination of approaches is exceptional and was not found to be used in 
other studies. At the same time, it is seen as coherent as the selected approaches 
complement each other in investigation of relationships between companies-competitors 
in business networks. While the business network approach perceives cooperation with 
network actors including competitors as unavoidable element of company existence and 
wealth, game theory and transaction cost approach supplement the former with analysis 
of benefits and risks from cooperative relations with competitors. Hence, being captured 
together the approaches provide opportunity to investigate elements of coopetitive 
modes in cross-border value chain coherently and comprehensively.  
Further there is a review of main ideas for all three approaches and their application to 
coopetition. Firstly, the business network approach is seen in general context and 
specified for the case of coopetition. Then game theory with its prisoner’s dilemma and 
stag hunt explains how competitors benefit from cooperation. Finally, the transaction 
costs approach complement the study with rational and practical view on coopetition. 
Such review helps to create a basis for the theoretical framework of the study presented 
afterwards. 
 
Business Network approach: 
inevitable relationships within 
network including competitors Coopetition 
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3.1. Coopetition from the business network approach 
Nowadays any particular company cannot be approached in vacuum without 
considering the surrounding environment (Håkansson and Snehota 1989) as any entity 
is not self-sufficient and cannot afford possession of all the resources necessary for 
production from raw materials to final product. Here resources include “manpower, 
equipment, plant, knowledge, image and financial means to sustain the activities” 
(Håkansson & Snehota 1995: 30). In terms of rapid market changes self-sufficient 
companies are bulky and sluggish. Thus, with the purpose to adapt value chain to 
changes and keep it more flexible companies have to focus on a limited number of 
activities and outsource the rest (Jarillo 1988). The companies become more 
interconnected with each other. In an attempt to explain the substance of such 
interconnections Håkansson and Snehota (1995: 26) proposed a model of activity links 
– resource ties – actor bonds (ARA-model). There limited resources to pursue activities 
lead to growth of external activity links with other market entities-actors (including 
competitors). At the same time, it tightens mutual interest of companies to each other 
and creates bonds.  In general, it means that every company is unique in terms of 
resource mix, carried activities and bonds, so the market becomes heterogeneous as 
opposed to classical Porterian theory (Håkansson and Snehota 1989) and companies 
need each other for successful existence. 
The mentioned considerations are gathered under the umbrella of the business network 
approach that sees market as network. It is widely applied to explain coopetition issues 
(i.e. Bengtsson & Kock 2000; Tidstöm 2006, Gimeno 2004) due to profound focus on 
business relationships of cooperative nature. Thus, cooperation between competitors 
falls also under the scope of the approach.  
According to the business network approach the companies are perceived as actors and 
they play variety of roles. The main roles are sellers, buyers and governmental 
organizations. So the companies interact between each other according to taken roles 
(Kock, Nisuls & Söderquist 2010).  
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The actors are embedded in relations to provide the process of resource exchange with 
the ultimate target to create value. Such relations are classified as vertical and horizontal 
(Osarenkhoe 2010). The former present mostly interactions in frames of value chain 
having supplier-customer character and resource exchange orientation. The latter are 
more equal in nature and take place between competitors and organizations sharing 
complementary capabilities; they target exchange of information and social-cultural 
activities. Additionally the relations can be divided in cooperative and competitive 
(Hertz & Mattson 2004: 35). The former includes both vertical supplier-customer 
relations and horizontal partnership between competitors. The latter are limited only 
with horizontal competitive relations between two or more actors towards development 
of relationships with the third party. 
Understanding of coopetition in the network comes from perception of every actor in 
the network on two levels of disaggregation (see Figure 8) (Jarillo 1988). Firstly, the 
company can be approached as a whole in the network. Then its connection to the 
competitors has dyadic nature combining competition and cooperation. As soon as the 
company is perceived as a bunch of activities for value creation (it is the second level), 
its roles vary in different activities. So division of competitive and cooperative relations 
between activities becomes obvious. Hence, there are no boundaries to have 
relationships with competitors of both types at the same time.  
Company BCompany A
Company BCompany A
Competition
Cooperation
Activity A1
Activity A2
Activity A3
Activity B1
Activity B2
Activity B3
Company C
COOPETITION
Competition
Cooperation
Cooperation
First level
Second level
 
Figure 8. Two levels of cooperative and competitive relations between companies. 
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According to this line of reasoning the business network approach argues that the 
companies are naturally embedded in the relationships and they are absolutely 
inevitable for company successful existence and development (Håkansson &  Ford 
2002) including expansion of activities abroad (Lue 2004: 16). Such necessities have 
external character. They do not appear inside the company but come from system 
imbalance due to market changes. So the relationships of the company can be seen as 
passive and reactive forced from network. This “call for resources” may emerge, for 
example, from customer wish to entry foreign market and bring own supplier, 
governmental protection or liberal laws, lack of independent suppliers in the target 
market and so on. Also in such case cooperation in the network even with competitors is 
a way to avoid the conflict and tension for scarce resources and utilize them more 
efficiently. 
In spite of the fact that such mutual dependencies on resources put limitations on actor 
actions towards each other and the third party, but they play the role of safeguard bonds 
against possible opportunism due to their mutual nature (Foss & Koch 1996; Steinicke, 
Wallenbur & Schmoltzi 2012), which is especially sensitive issue in competitor 
cooperation.  
At the same time the business network approach argues for the pro-active position of 
the company in the network. It does not mean that the company can control the network 
(Håkansson &  Ford 2002) but develop relationships in a way to maintain own position 
in the network to get superior treatment from other network actors (Osarenkhoe 2010). 
Looking for such voluntary relationships in business networks a company seizes 
opportunity to obtain knowledge from network or become a member of the group to 
neutralize possible threat and increase own importance. Such group membership effect 
may influence willingness in deals with non-members of the group.  
Finally, it can be concluded that the business network approach is not so unambiguous. 
It has clear bias in favour of cooperation (Foss & Koch 1996). Hence, it is able to justify 
coopetitive modes only partly due to its exclusive focus on cooperative relationships. 
Thus, to clarify competitive component of modes game theory and the transaction cost 
approach are applied and they are discussed further. 
35 
3.2. Coopetition in Game theory 
“Busines is a high-stakes game” was proposed by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995: 
57). This short statement uncovers other aproach of market perception as a game and is 
driven by game theory. The theory itself is value driven meaning that the companies so-
called players in the market target own value maximization.  However, novelty of the 
theory is in understanding that value maximization can be considered individually for 
every particular player or collectively as sum of values in the group. The basics of the 
theory argues that players interact with each other in the market. Their actions can be 
sequential or not but they always call reaction of the other parties in the game 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995). Game theory offers methods to calculate possible 
outcome from own actions as well as actions of other players. 
Applied to the coopetition game theory states two types of actions, viz. cooperative and 
competitive. Their meaning for players in terms of action interchange can be seen 
mostly in two types of games: prisoner’s dilemma and stag hunt (Skyrms 2004: 1 - 4). 
The former explains the choice of two prisoners caught for crimes between defection 
and staying silent (see Figure 9).  
 Player B 
Player A 
 Stay silent Defect 
Stay silent 2 0 
Defect 3 1 
Figure 9. Prisoner’s dilemma. 
From the individual point of view defection brings bigger pay-off (no punishment in 
this case) but it is not guaranteed that the other prisoner would stay silent. From 
collective perspective keeping silence as a form of cooperation will lead to the better 
pay-off for the whole system (two prisoners together). This case is fully applicable to 
business and reflects wishes of the players to act solely in fully competitive mode with a 
hope to bigger pay-off and passivness of the competitor. In fact, it turns to fierce 
competition from both sides and leads to pay-off reduction due to bigger expensies than 
in case of cooperation with competitor for a smaller but guaranteed output. 
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The stag hunt game explains also difference between competition and cooperation 
comparing individual hunt for a hare or collective hunt for a deer (see Figure 10). Thus,  
from the game settings one single player is not strong enough to hunt for a deer and 
capture its whole value solely, he can hunt only for hare that has sugnificantly less value 
than deer even shared with competitors. Hence, the bigger captured value comes from 
the cooperation. Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1997) offered to percieve the value as a 
“pie”. Cooperating together in value creation within different value chain activities 
competitors enlarge the “pie” issued to the market. Thus, it increases possibilities to 
capture a bigger share of the “pie” than without initial cooperation while sharing the 
“pie” and competing for customers in the markets. 
 Player B 
Player A 
 Cooperate Compete 
Cooperate 4 0 
Compete 3 1 
Figure 10. Stag hunt. 
Translating these games to the plane of coopetition game theory offers understanding of 
permanent company benefits through different interactions with the purpose to increase 
captured value. In international settings requests of contemporary company growth to 
maintain sustainable development leads to overcoming national borders in search of 
new bigger or unexplored markets. This is possible to do through competition playing 
passive habitual win-lose game in terms of the prisoner’s dilemma with unguaranteed 
outcome (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995). Otherwise, cooperation between 
competitive players looks more rational as it enlarges the “pie” delivered to the market 
(Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 2009) that is shared later in competition. Such 
relationships have win-win character and can be perceived even as more sustainable 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995, see discussion in Walley 2007) because they get 
less resistance from the side of competitors. However, win-win game requires forced 
interference of one of the players to turn the game from the ordinary win-lose mode. At 
the same time, a game change can be seen as an action to maintain own position in the 
market. Also similarly with the business network approach it has voluntary and pro-
active character. 
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Additionally it is essential to understand that according to game theory the company 
never puts aside own interests in favour of collective ones but aligns them with others in 
the market increasing common output (Padula and Dagnino 2007). Comparing with the 
business network approach coopetition in game theory highlights group relationships 
where every member seeks for own benefits like in stag hunt but not to threaten other 
groups and networks, for example. Thus, with the same result of gathering competitors 
for cooperation, the influensing elements differ from the points of view of the business 
network approach and game theory. The business network approach is for strengthen of 
a company individual position with help of cooperation in the group and the purpose is 
to resist to the third party. At the same time game theory proposes competitor 
cooperation to get at the end bigger “pie” for sharing in the market but not threaten the 
competitors that do not cooperate.    
Furthermore, the issue of trust plays a significant role in game theory especially in a 
repeated game (Hill 1990). Due to company search for the “pie” augmentation it tends 
to cooperate with players that have proved willingness to cooperate in the previous 
rounds of the game or there is information from other market members about reliability 
of company that is targeted for the cooperation.  Hence, game theory justifies trust as a 
element that defines the degree of cooperation and competition between competitors 
where lack of trust shifts balance towards competition and vice versa. 
Comparing two discussed approaches they observe coopetition in more constructive 
way. However, the purpose of the study would not be reached in a consistent way 
without a piece of critical perspective on the phenomenon. There is nothing perfectly 
positive in the real world. Thus, to add to the study a taste of modern ambiguous world 
and make it close to reality the transaction cost approach was added to the framework 
and it is discussed further. 
 
3.3. Coopetition from the transaction cost approach 
The last theoretical approach applied to the research framework of coopetition is the 
transaction cost approach. Its study comes from the assumption that amount of created 
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value depends on how and where activities are organized (Madhok 2002; Park and 
Russo 1996). It is partly similar to game theory assuming that partnership appears 
where value from collaboration will exceed the value captured in the absence of the 
partnership. But as opposed to the business network approach and game theory it puts 
aside company interdependencies and focuses on costs of activity governance and 
rationality. The company acting according to the transaction cost approach targets to 
minimize costs and selects always more economically effective way of productions. 
Thus, according to the approach every entity in the market has a choice to perform any 
particular activity in house or outsource it (Figure 11). In the first case the company 
carries expenses related to “in-house ownership of assets” (Park and Russo, 1996: 877) 
and exchange within a hierarchy. At the same time the company meets risk regarding 
return on investments in own facilities, which is even higher in terms of politic, 
economic, social and other uncertainties while internationalization. The second choice is 
to outsource activities, then expenses rise from exchange through the market and consist 
of “the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a contingent claims” (Hill, 1990: 
501). Such expenses are called transaction costs and gave the name to the theoretic 
approach. However, solution of market exchange is also uncertain with the risk of 
opportunism that comes from human wish of self-interest seeking (Williamson, 1985 in 
Hill 1990). From different cultural studies (i.e. Hofstede 2011; House et al. 2004) it is 
clear that probability and strength of opportunism vary among cultures and individuals 
around the world. Hence, it challenges managerial decision making in terms of picking 
right coopetitive mode while building cross-border value chain. 
Actually, opportunism is one of the key elements of the transaction cost approach and 
its possibility is an integral part of any transaction (Hill 1990). Without this 
phenomenon market exchange would considerably prevail over in-house activities (Hill 
1990) and transaction costs would be much obvious. However, the approach assumes 
that not all actors are opportunistic and not always (Madhok 2000). So the situation 
requests from managers to be aware of partner opportunism and arrange safeguards, i.e. 
mutual bonds, monitoring or enforcement (Hill 1990). The cost of safeguards is also a 
part of transaction costs. Still, the main difficulty is the accurate calculation of 
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safeguard amount as possibility of opportunism is hard to define especially to answer 
precisely who and when (Williamson 1985 in Madhok 2000). 
Transaction costs*
> 
Hierarchy costs**
Outsourced “buy” activity In-house “make” activityNoYes
Necessity to pursue 
activity in value chain
* Transaction costs – transaction costs  from market 
exchange (incl. safeguards against opportunism)
** Hierarchy costs - Costs from exchange through 
hierarchy
Possible solution: 
Cooperation with 
competitors
Possible solution: 
Competition with 
competitors
Risk of opportunism Risk of investments
 
Figure 11. Trade-off between transaction costs and hierarchy costs. 
In fact, the transaction cost approach looks for transactions efficiency, where 
governance mechanism is balanced between company risks of investments in own 
assets and risks of opportunism from partnership “attempting to avoid or weaken the 
hazards of each” (Park and Russo 1996: 877). So the theory sees coopetition not only as 
promising, for example, for learning facilitation on the one hand, but also as a thread for 
business due to opportunism on the other hand. Park and Russo (1996) even concluded 
that it was a very risky business when it involved cooperative relations with a 
competitor. It is logical as a competitor possesses better understanding of value added 
activities producing similar product and consequently better understanding of the area, 
where benefits gained from collaboration can be applied. Therefore, the risk of 
opportunism in coopetition is as higher as more direct the competitors and more similar 
their goals (Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco 2004). However, full similarity of 
the goals in different markets around the world is questionable due to great variety of 
environmental aspects shaping markets in particular countries.  
Trust is another significant issue in the transaction cost approach. It is opposed to 
opportunism and plays a role of transaction cost abater (Hill 1990). The higher the level 
of trust between competitors, the easier it would be for them to settle cooperative 
relationships as the necessity of safeguards is lower that consequently decreases 
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transaction costs in favor of market mechanism. In general trust is broad term and 
pointed also by game theory. However, there other rationale is put behind as it was 
described above in the correspondent chapter.  
 
3.4. Summary  
The observation of the approaches gives the impression that they all are able to explain 
the phenomenon of coopetition. In fact, they do explain, so the same relationships 
between companies can be investigated using different logics. As any theory, three 
presented approaches are not universal and focus on particular issue in the relationships, 
hence, the fusion of the approaches gives deeper and more sustainable understanding of 
elements influencing coopetitive mode selection in cross-border value chain by the 
decision-makers in the companies. The comparison of the approaches and elements 
explaining by them is presented in Table 1. 
Obviously, the approaches have differences perceiving elements influencing degree of 
cooperation and competition. Thus, the business network approach sees natural 
embedment into relationships, i.e. there is no other choice to survive then cooperate 
with other network actors including competitors. At the same time game theory is more 
unrestricted and leave a choice to “hunt a hare” in fierce competition or “hunt a stag” in 
cooperation. Therefore, competitors cooperate in seek of individual outcome increase, 
but still the analysis takes place what is better to compete or cooperate. Opposed to two 
previous approaches the transaction cost approach looks critically on coopetitive 
relationships and clarifies why not to do it. In general it can be considered that the 
approach complements game theory analyzing disadvantages of cooperation with 
competitor in terms of opportunistic risks.  
 
 
 
41 
Table 1. The theoretical approaches and their contribution to coopetion. 
Theoretical 
approaches 
Main arguments Explanation of 
coopetition 
Elements 
defining degree 
of cooperation 
and coopetition 
Key references 
Business 
Network 
Approach 
Companies are 
naturally 
embedded in the 
relationships of 
cooperative 
nature to create 
value 
Cooperation 
between 
competitors is a 
necessary 
condition of 
company 
existence  
Survival 
avoidance of 
scarce resources 
Voluntary 
position 
maintenance – 
reputation in 
long-term 
relations 
Jarillo (1988); 
Håkansson & 
Ford (2002); 
Hertz & Mattson 
(2004);  
Game Theory The companies 
play a game with 
sequence of 
moves. The 
moves can be 
cooperative and 
competitive 
nature enriching 
or destroying 
results of the 
previous moves 
Cooperation with 
competitors is 
beneficial for 
both parties. 
Win-win strategy 
when 
competitors 
compete – 
mutual creation 
of the “pie”, 
separate 
appropriation of 
the “pie” 
Own benefits 
through 
cooperation and 
game change 
(win-win) – 
proactive 
position 
maintenance 
Losses 
minimization 
from competition 
(win-lose) 
Trust and 
reputation in 
repeated game  
Branderburger & 
Naleduff (1995); 
Nalebuff & 
Brandenburger 
(1997); Padula & 
Dagnino (2007) 
Transaction 
cost approach 
The decision 
about activity 
pursuance (in-
house or 
outsource) is 
taken based on 
comparison of 
transaction costs 
and hierarchy 
costs 
Weighing of 
opportunistic 
risks from 
cooperation with 
competitor and 
risks of 
investments risk 
from in-house 
activities 
Risks of 
opportunism in 
cooperation 
Risks of 
investments in 
competition 
Hill (1990); Park 
& Russo (1996); 
Quintana-Garcia 
and Benavides-
Velasco 2004 
 
Definitely the approaches have similarities explaining coopetitive relationships between 
companies. For example, business network approach and game theory highlight pro-
activity in relationships with the purpose to maintain own position in the network. They 
consider reputation in long-term relationships (business network approach) and repeated 
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game (game theory) as element in favor of cooperation with competitors. Interestingly 
the business network approach argues that business goals convergence is fruitful for 
cooperation and mitigate conflicts (Håkansson & Ivan 1995). On the other hand, the 
transaction cost approach claims that goals convergence call conflict and less desired to 
build sustainable cooperation between competitors (Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-
Velasco 2004). 
Three approaches deduce similar and different elements influencing coopetitive modes. 
Thus, their simultaneous application helps to develop more consistent overview and 
coherent explanation, how coopetition appears and why it is proposed as a form of 
relationships between companies. 
Gathering together all the propositions done in the previous chapters about value chain 
and coopetition and in this chapter about prerequisites and perception of coopetition, the 
theoretical framework of the study can be assembled. It comes from the sequence of the 
assumptions. Firstly, to create value the company has a value chain with different 
activities. Such activities fall under competitive and/or cooperative relationships with 
market actors. Then when focus of interest is narrowed till relationships between two 
actors who are competitors, coopetition with its coopetitive modes appears. Finally, 
taking broader perspective, the relationships are investigated through the lenses of 
theoretical approaches that raise elements for such relationships. The visualization of 
the theoretical framework is presented in Figure 12. It is worth to mention that in real 
life the presented sequence (from value chain activities to elements) is reversal and 
starts from the definition of the elements shaping coopetitive relationships and 
influencing decision making in favor of cooperation, competition or both in certain 
value chain activities. 
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Figure 12. Theoretical approaches and elements of coopetition. 
Further the empirical study is conducted to define particular elements influencing the 
patterns of coopetitive relations in value chain activities. The study has explorative 
character as it is assumed that the mentioned perspectives on the coopetition from all 
three approaches are not exhaustive but was found the most applicable and obvious in 
search for elements influencing coopetitive modes in the value chain. Consequently, the 
empirical study will focus on elements identification from cases and their explanation 
from the position of the theoretical approaches.   
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
The chapter contains the methodology applied for the empirical part of the study. 
Firstly, research design and its argumentation are presented. Then deployed explanation 
of data collection and analysis is provided. They are followed by discussion about 
trustworthiness of the study.  
 
4.1. Research design 
From the theoretical point of view there are a number of models and approaches to 
design and conduct research. The correct definition of the research design is crucial for 
successful answer to the research questions and positive contribution to the body of 
knowledge. However, consistence of the research purpose and design are not the only 
issues that must be taken into consideration. The constraints of the real world shape the 
research design significantly (Maylor & Blackmon 2005: 137). They are time and 
resource limitation, information confidentiality or even personal preferences of the 
participants. Thus, to conduct valuable research aligned with the declared purpose and 
real world constrains the following methods were selected: 
 Semi-deduction as research logic; 
 Case study as research strategy; 
 Qualitative approach for data collection and analysis; 
 Semi-structured individual interviews as research method. 
The choice is visualized in Figure 13 and further it is explained and argued. 
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Figure 13. The research design choice. 
Choice of the research logic usually lies between two, namely deduction and induction 
(Maylor & Blackmon 2005: 150 – 152). Deductive studies based on existing theoretical 
framework test hypothesis with cause-effect link. On the contrary, induction starts with 
the data collection and pattern analysis to generate the theory. However, both logics are 
too extreme to be applied in the real world in pure form. For example, Strauss and 
Corbin (1990: 50) as well as Bryman and Bell (2011: 12 – 13) questioned possibility of 
any research without background. Dubois and Gadde (2002: 555) add that “theory 
cannot be understood without empirical observation and vice versa”. In other words, 
separate application of deduction and induction are seen too dry in an attempt to 
develop knowledge especially in managerial studies, where a lot of grounded research 
has been already done and purely new areas are less likely to discover. The third logic 
lies in between and is called abduction. It combines inductive radical theory changes 
and deductive tests of existing approaches.  
At the beginning the current study was planned to be accomplished in abduction. 
However, the logic requires the consequences of engagements between theory and 
empirical explorations (Atkinson & Delamont 2005) that were not possible to reproduce 
in time frames intended for the study. Thus, the current study is conducted in logic that 
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is closer to deduction.  According to it, firstly, the literature on the topic was reviewed. 
Nonetheless, it discovered only small number of studies with focus on coopetition in 
value chain. They were mostly either on the whole relationships or particular activities. 
In such circumstances it was not possible to deduce proper hypothesis for scrutiny.  
Nevertheless, taking broader perspectives on the phenomenon of coopetition the 
existing theories provides the basis to build the original theoretical framework. Later 
after the empirical study the framework has freedom to be modified and clarified 
according to findings. Hence, semi-deduction as research logic is adopted to generate 
new concerns regarding the phenomenon of coopetition particularly applied to value 
chain activities with connection to the three theoretical approaches: the business 
network approach, game theory and the transaction cost approach. 
Then case study was selected as research strategy among others. This is common in 
many disciplines including business and management (Dubois and Gadde 2002). The 
case study was preferred to other strategies due to unsuitability of the rest for semi-
deduction logic (i.e. grounded theory or ethnography) or impossibility to form adequate 
conditions to conduct, for example, survey or experiment. Hence, the research is done 
through looking for patterns. From realistic point of view the case study is seen as the 
most appropriate for the current research considering defined research logic and 
constraints from time and resource limitations. It can be done within short period of 
time that is dedicated for the master’s thesis and in only one location where the case 
company is situated. At the same time, it provides more links between phenomenon and 
real life context (Yin 2003: 2 - 11; Saunders et al. 2009: 146) creating a bridge between 
academic knowledge and existent amendments (Dubois and Gadde 2002). At the same 
time case study requires usage of multiple sources for data collection that complicates 
procedure of empirical research but provides more comprehensive findings. 
The case study strategy is criticized for being situational and specific that creates 
obstacles for generalization (Dubois and Gadde 2002; Yin 2003: 10; Bryman & Bell 
2011: 61; see discussion in Hillebrand, Kok & Biemans 2001). Mostly, the claims are 
about statistical generalization. However, it is worth to understand that a particular case 
study cannot be seen as a sample unit, rather as a new experiment (Yin 2003: 32) doing 
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with the purpose to learn and seize opportunities for further development of more mass-
scale studies.  
The case study is specified by the unit of analysis. There is variety of possibilities from 
a role or individual to the whole organizations or even groups of organizations (Miles & 
Huberman 1994). The current work is done from the perspective of the single company 
(mentioned in Chapter 1.2), so a company is accepted as a unit of analysis here. 
Multi-case study was a necessary addition to the research design as originally work was 
planned as a single case study. In reality the company that agreed to participate in the 
study worked in area of online business. That is not widespread in the studies of 
coopetition. Thus, it could be difficult to develop findings and argue about their 
applicability for business where exchange of physical product takes place. So the 
second case was found from the area of physical production to support replication and 
contrast (Maylor & Blackmon 2005: 246). The patterns are looked across the cases. At 
the same time two cases are considered enough to provide adequate depth within given 
time limitation. 
The case study strategy supports both approaches of data collection and analysis, viz. 
quantitative and qualitative. Nevertheless, considering limited theoretical base the 
qualitative approach is selected for the study. The contrary quantitative approach is 
based on statistics and measurements estimated from the existing theories. It is applied 
when the scientist is sure about obtaining the comprehensive perspective through the 
questions with limited number of answers as only such information is suitable for 
measurement later while analysis (Saunders et al. 2009: 414). In the situation when 
measuring is less likely due to complexity of questions or unpredictable variety of 
answers, the qualitative approach is applied. The typical questions for quantitative study 
are “How much” and “What” in form of “how much” and “how many” (Maylor & 
Blackmon 2005: 153; Yin 2003: 6). Consequently, the current study aims to find 
meanings answering questions “Why” and “How” that are more suitable for qualitative 
study. Furthermore, “What” in form of exploration is used as well (Yin 2003: 6). It is 
argued that the richness of the study would suffer if the answers to the research 
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questions were restricted. Thus, the qualitative approach is adopted in search of fresh 
findings unlimited with theoretical interpretations. 
Finally, the interviews were selected as the main method of the research. They are 
common for the qualitative studies (Maylor & Blackmon 2005: 185). Stephens (2009: 
93) considered that they lie “at the heart of qualitative studies”. Then Yin (2003: 89) 
added that interviews are one of the key information sources in case studies. Among 
different types of interviews semi-structured individual interviews were used. Firstly, 
semi-structured interview were preferred to structured ones as they allow a degree of 
freedom from both sides of the researcher and the respondent providing deeper insights 
and shortcuts to the prior history especially in conversation with well-informed 
respondents (Yin 2003: 92). Then individual interviews were preferred to group ones as 
the former can be better controlled by the interviewer and output is less chaotic (Kvale 
1996: 101). Consequently, individual interviews are easy for further systematic analysis 
and correspond to the level of author’s experience. The questions had open-ended 
character and did not limit the respondent with the number of answers. Such approach 
provides rich basis for findings (Fontana & Frey 2000) but requires caution in analysis 
of transcripts and dangerous with possibility of incorrect interpretation of the interview 
context unless proper precautions regarding interview trustworthiness are done (see 
discussion in Chapter 4.4).  
The interview process was build based on step-by-step approach (Tidström 2006). The 
multiple interviews with the same respondent took place separated in time. The 
approach intended to build better relationships between researcher and informants to 
acquire more information comparing to only one interview and to get deeper insights on 
the topic of the research increasing understanding of the phenomenon.  
The interviews were performed in several ways: face-to-face, phone interviews and 
internet chat. The first way is considered to be the best to capture the most details from 
verbal and non-verbal communication (Maylor & Blackmon 2005: 183). However, it is 
costly and time-consuming especially when researcher and informants are located in the 
different countries. Hence, face-to-face interview were complemented with phone 
interviews and Internet chat. The former way is often used for marketing and political 
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research and may be associated with reluctant participation (Maylor & Blackmon 2005: 
184). However, in the current study due to limited number of participants all phone 
interviews and Internet chat were scheduled in advance. Moreover, these ways of 
interviews are benefited in terms of flexibility as they can be settled during early or late 
hours when it is more convenient for the respondent considering his/her hectic business 
schedule. Additionally, phone interviews are easier to re-settle in terms of time in case 
of any changes in respondent’s availability.  
All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. Additionally for better justification of 
the interviews notes were taken during the process. Both interview transcriptions and 
the researcher's notes represent the main sources for the analysis. Moreover, the 
additional sources were used to support the facts shared by respondents. They are a 
third-party interview, information presented in the company official web-pages and a 
draft of the cooperative agreement (in case 1). 
To sum up the selection of semi-deduction, case study, qualitative analyses and semi-
structured interviews is consistent and aligned to the purpose of the study aiming 
maximization of valuable contribution. 
 
4.2. Research process 
The main elements of the research process were the same for two accomplished cases. 
The cases were found through the personal networks, however they fulfill criteria of the 
research purpose (viz. cooperation with competitors in foreign activities) so can be 
considered appropriate.  
At the beginning, the co-owners of the case companies were contacted by e-mail. It 
contained brief explanation of the study purpose and the criteria for selection. Both co-
owners confirmed the fit to the criteria and agreed to participate in the study. 
The first initial interview in the first case had the purpose of introduction into the issue. 
The respondent (A) was offered to discuss the issue in general, clarify the main 
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terminology of the business area and peculiarities of doing business.  At the end he was 
requested to recommend any of his colleagues, who participated also in the case 
relationships and who would also be able to present own opinion on the issue. One 
additional reference was given. During the same first interview the question of 
participation of the counter-parties (competitors with whom cooperated) was asked. 
Unfortunately, the possibility was declined due to sensitive topic of the issue and fragile 
balance in relationships. After the first interview the investigation in the area of the 
company business was done, and the interview guide (Appendix 2) based on research 
questions and theoretical framework was created. The contact with the second informant 
(C) was done, he was also provided with information about the study and its purpose.  
Then the interviews had follow-up character and targeted clarification and widening of 
the facts obtained from the initial interview. The respondents were provided with short 
written note with the outline of the interview a day in advance. It was considered 
beneficial for the research since the questions required reflection and extended answers 
that may be challenging to figure properly and express correctly in the moment of the 
interview.   So the note with the interview outline gave a chance to think on the case and 
even remember some significant issues. The second interview in row was done with the 
same informant, who participated in the first preliminary interview. Then the interview 
with the second informant (C) took place. He was also a co-owner of the company and 
had decision-making power in the case issue. Both interviews had similar structure and 
targeted clarification of the case and more detailed explanation of the relationships. 
At the beginning of the interview the respondents were asked general questions about 
the company, viz. company profile, business area, geographic spread of activities and 
markets of presence. Further the questions touched the explanation of the company 
value chain and responsibility for activities, i.e. in-house of outsourced. Then the 
situation with the competition and cooperation in the industry was discussed in home 
market in both cases and in penetrated market in the first case. Later the questions 
returned to the particular case that was under investigation. Such brief case explanation 
was requested again from the first informant. For the second informant (C) it was the 
first time. That repetitive request aimed to discover possible new information that might 
appear in relationships between competitors as the interviews were separated in time. 
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Then with all asked background it was quite obvious to move the discussion to the 
essence of coopetitive relationships, so the respondents were asked about particular 
activities that fell under cooperation and competition with competitors and also about 
elements that influenced such choice of coopetitive modes. 
Three interviews for case 2 were handled with the same pattern as it is described above 
for case 1. However, the interview guide was modified according to specificity of the 
company value chain and the fact that the coopetition took place in the home market of 
the respondents. 
The interviews were held during the period August – December 2011 and continued 
from 21 to 130 minutes.  Six interviews were conducted in total: two face-to-face 
interviews, three telephone interviews, one Internet chat (see Table 2). Variety of 
interview types was caused by temporary distant locations of the author and the 
respondents complicated by time limitation. Furthermore, some respondents had 
preferences regarding the form of interview (i.e. required Internet chat instead of phone 
conversation). This can be explained by differences in the respondents' personal 
preferences (i.e. discomfort of communication by phone) and also by the preferable 
pattern of business negotiations, viz. chatting in online business. 
Table 2. List of interviews. 
Case Informant Date Duration Type Step 
1 A 04 Aug 2011 60 min Face-to-face Intro 
2 B 13 Aug 2011 21 min Phone Intro 
1 A 22 Oct 2011 130 min Chat Follow-up 
2 B 29 Oct 2011 50 min Phone Follow-up 
1 C 22 Nov 2011  51 min Phone Follow-up 
2 D 28 Dec 2011 45 min Face-to-face Follow-up 
Face-to-face interviews took place during working time but in neutral but convenient 
places (not offices) offered by respondents. It increased the possibility of interruption by 
phone calls, but still quiet places that were distant from respondent's usual work place 
provided relax atmosphere without interruptions from colleagues and work routine that 
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may be crucial for the interview success. Phone interviews and the chat were held in 
time pointed by the respondents out of standard working hours. So the respondents 
could answer the questions with full dedication, in convenient pace and minimum 
interruptions. In total one face-to-face interview and two phone interviews were 
interrupted by external phone calls to the respondents. But all the interviews continued 
after the break and were completed according to the interview guide. 
All the interviews were held in Russian that was a native language for the interviewer 
and respondents. All the interviews were recorded with kind allowance of the 
respondents and transcribed later for analysis. The selected parts of the interviews were 
further translated into English.  
 
4.3. Data analysis 
For the analysis the transcription of six interviews were used. Date of the interview, 
data of interviewee, case number were mentioned for every particular transcription to 
facilitate data order. The transcripts were kept in original Russian language. No 
translation was done to eliminate any data loses. Due to modest number of interviews 
no computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software was used, all manipulations 
were fulfilled in one of the common word-processing software. 
Furthermore, during the process of transcription the author's thoughts and 
considerations that appeared regarding the particular respondent answer were carefully 
written and used later to enhance data analysis. To facilitate analysis the answers were 
marked in accordance to the topics mentioned in the interview guide (Appendix 2). 
After completion of all interviews and their transcriptions, the author became 
familiarized with the gathered material through repeatedly reading of the material and 
continuously keeping notes. 
Finally qualitative content analysis (Bryman & Bell 2011: 560) was applied to the 
material. The method is commonly used in managerial studies and consists of data 
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codification with the purpose to identify recurrent instances that later unified in 
categories (Wilkinson 2004). Then the latter is analysed with the purpose to recognize 
meaning. The main difference from the quantitative content analysis is that initial 
categorization is not predefined precisely. Thus, the researcher has more freedom to 
“constant discovery” (Altheide 1996: 16 in Bryman & Bell 2011: 560). Furthermore, 
qualitative content analysis looks for meanings but not only for frequency counts. 
Hence, it reflects better the design of the current study.  The initial categories for the 
current study were “value chain activities” and “elements of cooperation and 
coopetition”. 
During the analysis the data was reordered based on identified patterns. Then the 
gathered pattern was mapped in an attempt to find the match with the theoretical 
approaches selected for the study or discover some new insights.  
 
4.4. Trustworthiness of the empirical study 
Firstly, the study is examined for reliability that argues the possibility of the study 
repetition and getting the same or similar results (Maylor & Blackmon 2005: 362). In 
case of qualitative study it is very sensitive question as the sample is very small and 
often industry, or market, or area specific. However, the detailed specification of the 
process, how it was done, and structured documentation for the current study increase 
reliability. Furthermore, the interview structure (one introduction interview + two 
follow-up interviews) was repeated in both cases that allows also to assess the results as 
reliable. Furthermore, during the follow-up interviews the explanation of the case 
situation was requested again with the purpose of improving reliability of the 
information. 
Besides, the utilization of the personal networks was found beneficial generating 
trustworthy responses during communication with the respondents. 
Then, validity of the study claims for trustworthiness of the results and avoidance of any 
bias and ambiguity in design of the conduction process and interpretation of the results 
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(Simons 2009: 127). A number of measures were taken to increase validity of the 
current study. Firstly, the basic precautions were done during the interview process. All 
interviews were conducted in the native language for both interviewee and interviewer, 
in other words they were done in the situation of linguistic equality (Marschan-Piekkari 
& Reis 2004) that minimizes ambiguity and misunderstandings during information 
exchange and further during analysis. Furthermore, speaking native language was 
essential as the respondents used a lot of industry terminology (especially case 1) and 
specific slang that was often a mix of English and Russian. So understanding of 
meaning and analysis would be difficult for non-native speaker. Then to secure 
correctness of translation the translated parts were given for back translation to Russian 
to a person who spoke Russian as mother tongue and had English studies in 
background. The result of back translation was compared with original. The appeared 
discrepancies were corrected and back translation was repeated till elimination of all  
discrepancies. 
Furthermore, to increase validity triangulation in form multiple sources and evidences 
was applied for the data collection (Yin 2003: 97). Thereby, the interview process since 
the beginning was designed based on multiple informants. This method secures 
confidence in obtaining objective data addressing the same facts and mitigates 
individual influence and subjectivity. Furthermore, the respondents were selected 
among persons who were well informed and directly participated in the decision-
making in case issues. Then multiple sources of data consolidate the information 
obtained from the interviews. Interview from the third source, draft of partnership 
agreement and information available on the companies’ official web-sites were used to 
exclude unreliable data from the material for analysis.   
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5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS – DIVERSITY AND CATHOLICITY 
OF ELEMENTS 
 
The chapter contains empirical part of the study. Two case studies are firstly briefly 
described one by one and later analyzed according to research objectives. Then cross 
comparison is presented looking for examples of replication and contrast. Finally, the 
findings are allocated in the theoretical framework and its modification is proposed.  
 
5.1. Case descriptions 
5.1.1. Case 1 
The first case is about Russian company that develops and publishes games in the social 
network services (SNS) and mobile platforms. The essence of the case is the 
relationships appeared from the game launch in South Korean network in cooperation 
with local South Korean publisher. Such cooperation leaves room for competition 
between games in the portfolio of South Korean Publisher in the local market.  The 
additional special appeal of the case is in the presence of one more company that is 
Russian developer and consequently a competitor of the main company, additionally it 
has already entered South Korean market with the same publisher. However, all 
relationships have dyadic character, viz. (1) between two Russian developers, between 
the first Russian developer and South Korean publisher and between the second Russian 
developer and South Korean publisher. The study participants insisted on anonymity, so 
in the case they are mentioned as Paco, Cado and Tuma. The contacts were made with 
Paco’s co-founders particularly for the current study. Within the first preliminary 
interview Paco co-founder stated that Cado and Tuma are approached as competitors 
and the fact of cooperation between companies was also confirmed. 
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The case is found to be fruitful for the research as the situation in Paco’s relationships 
answers the focus of research. Firstly, internationalization element takes place as the 
company launches the product in the foreign market. Secondly, Paco perceives Cado 
and Tuma as competitors and simultaneously accepts facts of cooperation in Russian 
and South Korean markets. Finally, the companies can be defined as competitors 
according to definition of competition used for the study.  
One more argument regarding the inclusion of the case in the study appears from the 
nature of the company business. Online game industry and social network services do 
not have too much attention from managerial studies. However, they are the business 
areas with growing power and turnovers that deserve to be researched equally with 
industries of physical production. Therefore, the current study is one of the first 
attempts to know applicability of commonly used coopetition theory to virtual business.  
Company 
Among three companies mentioned above the case study takes position of Paco as the 
primary source of information. It is a young and relatively small company. It was 
founded in 2009 by two enthusiastic managers and since that time it has grown in the 
team of more than 30 employees. The company started from development and 
publishing of the games in Russian social networks. Further the business was expanded 
to the application for the popular mobile platforms. Currently the company is included 
in the TOP-10 of Russian social game developers. 
The company arranges almost all value chain activities in-house (see Figure 14). They 
include work from the game idea till the game launch in the social network or mobile 
platform. All together it can be seen as the first stage including only upstream 
production-oriented activities. To be more specific, inside there are research for a game 
idea (original or adapted), game design, game mechanics and programming. The last 
three activities are fulfilled simultaneously and assemble the game from the idea and the 
first fake screenshots to mass-launch in SNS including interface creation, rounds of 
tests, corrections and bug fixes.  
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Figure 14. Value Chain of Paco. 
Mass-launch in SNS starts the second stage and adds to standard programming, game 
design and game mechanics downstream activities, viz. marketing and promotion. They 
are necessary to attract players’ attention to the product.  
Logically the main profit contribution comes after the mass-launch. However, to 
maintain it on a certain level or even increase it, the game needs to be constantly 
upgraded to keep player interest. Such after-launch update is seen by Paco’s co-
founders equally important as the first-stage activities. But still these activities can be 
seen as downstream. 
As the company’s primary market locates in the Internet it is challenging to define 
clearly the geographic spread of presence but still main customers are located in Russia 
and CIS countries as the main platforms for their games are Russian SNSs. However, 
the company is acknowledged with the foreign markets as it has game launches in local 
European networks as well as in Facebook. Still Asian market stays uncover but very 
promising. 
Situation of coopetition in cross-border value chain 
Paco’s strategy is to maximize profit from the games via their launch in different 
networks around the world. Hence, the company growth is possible in two ways. One is 
to create and launch new games in the existing networks. Another one is to launch the 
existing games in different networks. Paco uses normally both. 
Hence, Pako is constantly looking for new markets and possibilities of growth. The idea 
to enter South Korean market was one of them. Attractiveness of South Korean market 
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was obvious. There gamers are 5-6 times more profitable than Russian ones and 1,5 
times more profitable than in the USA (see the profile of South Korean social game 
industry in Appendix 1). Additionally South Korean publishers contacted proactively 
Paco with requests to cooperate. 
In March-April 2011 the company decided to enter South Korean social networks with 
one of existing games. Licensing mode was picked as an entry mode. By the time when 
the decision was made, other Russian developer, and consequently a competitor of Paco 
in Russian market, Tuma entered South Korean market through cooperation with the 
same Korean publisher. 
The products (games) chosen for South Korean market was firstly launched in Russian 
SNSs and were well known there since 2010. One of two games has no analogs in South 
Korean market. Another game had a similar genre with the number one in the market by 
Tuma. 
Thus, Paco, Cado and Tuma have direct and indirect relations of cooperative and 
competitive nature in Russian and South Korean markets as it is shown in the Figure 15. 
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Figure 15.  Cooperation and competition between companies in case 1. 
Considering Russian market Paco and Tuma know each other during a period of time. 
They launch games in the same SNSs so they compete for players’ attention and money 
there. At the same time, they stay in contact and exchange information about market 
trends and even profitability of the games. Such communication became a source where 
Paco knew about South Korean market and its possibilities from. In South Korean 
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market Paco develop games and Cado publish them. The deal required close 
communication in terms of game localization as Cado knew the requirements of the 
market and Paco possessed the tools and knowledge how the implement requirements in 
the game play. Simultaneously, licensed Paco’s games compete for the customers and 
their attention with own Cado’s products including licensed Tuma’s games. The closer 
and detailed analysis of the described relationships is presented further in Chapter 5.2.1.  
5.1.2. Case 2 
Considering that the first case is not from the area of material production it was decided 
to be complemented with one more case covering the research question in more 
traditional environment where the physical goods is the output of the value chain. 
Hence, the second case explores the situation of relations between Russian wholesaler 
and Swiss manufacturer of skill toys. The former distributes skill toys and other similar 
equipment from different suppliers including the Swiss manufacturer. The latter 
supplies own production to Russian market also through the authorized dealer. The 
essence of the case is the product that the manufacturer supplied to the wholesaler for 
sale in Russian market but at the same time, the product was supplied to the market 
through the manufacturer’s own channels. Again following the request of anonymity 
from the participants the companies are named Nap, Vect and Bogu. Contacts were 
made with Nap’s co-founders exclusively for the current.  
The second case is found to be complementary for the first one due to similar nature and 
conditions where three companies were discovered in dyadic relationships of direct and 
indirect competition and cooperation. The fact was accepted by Nap’s co-founders 
during the interviews. Furthermore, the actions took place in the market that is foreign 
for one of the case participants and this is a necessary element for the research question. 
Hence, the case was proved to be suitable for the current study. At the same time, it 
examines more traditional business dealing with physical product. Therefore, it is a 
promising opportunity to compare applicability of coopetition theory to business in 
virtual and real world.  
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Company 
The ancestor of the case company is Russian retail chain selling skill toys and 
equipment for active entertainment and sport. Feeling fast growth managers decided to 
detach a wholesale department of the parent company in a separate entity. So Nap was 
founded in 2009 and is a branch of the big skill toy retailer. Currently the company 
employs around 20 people and sells production around Russia to the shops of the parent 
company and in a franchise chain. 
Since the beginning Nap had the vision and strategy of business. The managers believe 
that the sold production must (1) have high quality and durability, (2) be desirable by 
both children and parents and (3) create a skill through socialization in a peer-group.  
All the mentioned points must support popularization of the skill toy in Russian market, 
at the same time business is aimed to be profitable.  
Despite the fact that the parent retailer remains the biggest customer for Nap, another 
direction of independent development is franchising network. Thus, external customers 
have access to the products sold by Nap. 
The value chain of Nap consists of in-house logistics, marketing and sales activities and 
outsourced product R&D and production (see Figure 16). 
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Figure 16. Value chain of Nap. 
Thus, from the Figure 16 it is clear that the company outsources upstream activities and 
keeps in-house downstream activities.  
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Situation of coopetition in cross-border value chain 
In 2009 Nap knew about the skill toy X from its permanent Russian supplier. The latter 
provided it to Russian market from Swiss manufacturer Vect (see also profile of 
Russian skill toy industry in Appendix 1). Skill toy X was interesting for Nap because it 
corresponded fully to the vision and strategy of the company and had to be included in 
the assortment. However, the supplier was not able to provide the product and some 
months later stopped distribution of Vect’s products in Russia. So it was clear that the 
product is promising for Russian market but there was no active distribution and 
contacts with the manufacturer. 
Nap tried to contact Vect straightly with hope to negotiate direct shipments without 
intermediaries. Furthermore, a closer investigation discovered that the assortment of 
Vect included more items corresponding to the vision of Nap, it increased interest for 
cooperation. In spring 2010 Vect finally answered Nap that another Russian wholesaler 
Bogu was nominated as official distributor of Vect in Russia.  
Nap continued negotiations with Vect regarding possible supply independently from 
Bogu. Finally, the agreement was settled. That leaded to situation of coopetition (see 
Figure 17).  
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Figure 17.Cooperation and competition between companies in case 2. 
There Nap cooperated with Vect in product supply to Russian market. At the same time 
they competed with each other in Vect’s products offered to Russian customer. 
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However, the coopetition had indirect character as Vect served Russian market via the 
official distributor Bogu. Additionally, Bogu competed with Nap directly in other 
product besides Vect’s items. The closer and detailed analysis of the described 
relationships is presented further in Chapter 5.2.2. 
 
5.2. Analysis of the findings 
5.2.1. Case 1 
Why does the company enter coopetitive relations when expanding activities abroad?  
Considering worldwide ardour for Internet and services that it provides, it is reasonable 
that Paco expands abroad willingly following the opportunity to benefit from the variety 
of local social network services around the globe.  However, it does not mean that every 
single network is a target for penetration. 
“It is not so obvious sometimes with some networks [SNS] and publishers, 
whether there is money or not. In other words, it would be spent time for launch 
and we would earn no profit.“(Respondent A) 
Subsequently, Paco defines about foreign market penetration based on proper reliable 
information about game monetization fulfilling the main company goal, namely profit 
maximization. In case of South Korean market, Tuma, Paco’s competitor in Russian 
market, was such source of information. 
“We had intentions towards internationalization. However we might not consider 
South Korea [unless information from Tuma], or pay attention to it significantly 
later.“ (Respondent A) 
Further, the management decides about entry mode. As a rule, the selection is usually 
between arranging activities in-house or cooperation with a local company that has 
already some set-ups in the target market.  
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“Mainly cooperation takes place for other [than home] market expansion where it 
is difficult to enter by ourselves or where it is no sense [to enter by ourselves].“ 
(Respondent A) 
“By that time [entry South Korean market] we had already experience of 
cooperation with publishers. In general, it makes sense to enter the market with a 
publisher in that case, when, firstly, we have to spend a lot of resources to enter 
the market by ourselves…; secondly, we know the targeted SNS poorly. On the 
other hand, Facebook is worth to get acknowledge by ourselves. But talking about 
other SNSs, there are too many. If we tried to enter every SNS on our own, we 
would not have simply enough strength and resources. We would spend a lot of 
resources and might get very little profit. But with the assistance of an 
intermediary [local company] we spend minimum resources and if the game does 
not earn money, our financial loses will be minimized.“ (Respondent C) 
Hence, Paco has experienced both entry modes and evaluates their possibilities in every 
case separately. For South Korean market the choice was obvious due to clear reasons. 
“Firstly, we do not know Korean language, so in any case it is more challenging 
for us to understand the market situation. Secondly, we poorly know market 
specificity itself.“ (Respondent C) 
Thus, Paco decided to expand marketing activities to South Korean market with help of 
a local partner and decision was done in favor of cooperation with competitor. Close 
investigation of industry specificity and its value chain discovered that there was no 
variety of channels to deliver the game from the developer to the SNS provider. There is 
only one kind of actors; they are publishers. However, sometimes the developer carries 
the role of the publisher also, as in the investigated case. Hence, Paco had to cooperate 
with a competitor due to carrying both roles in the network, viz. developer and 
publisher. The fact of the forced cooperation was identified by Bengtsson and Kock 
(1999), however there it was justified due to mutual company development but not 
because of played roles. 
This is the interesting finding as approaches observed in the theoretical part do not see 
cooperation with a competitor as an absolute inevitability. Even the business network 
approach that highlights natural embedment in the relationships (Håkansson &  Ford 
2002) considers coopetition as one of possibilities among other types of relationships 
(Bengtsson & Kock 1999). Game theory explains coopetition as alternative win-win 
strategy to traditional win-lose competition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995). 
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Obviously, perceiving the question broader, namely the choice between entering of 
South Korean market or not, cooperation with the competitor does not look so 
unavoidable and a number of choices appears. But still the question is not “compete or 
cooperate” but limited till “compete or cooperate with the competitor”. Hence, the 
theoretical approaches included in the study are limited in considerations that there is no 
other choice than cooperation with competitors when the particular market for activities 
expansion is defined. Furthermore, considering huge differences in national markets at 
least in terms of mentioned language variety and hostile unknown environment, such 
“no choice” limitations could be assumed greater than in case of any activity expansion 
in the home market. 
Additionally, the choice limitation comes definitely as Paco plays simultaneously roles 
of developer and publisher so any market entry for game launch with the partner would 
be the case of coopetition. Thus, it can be proposed that the more roles the company 
plays in the network, the more inevitable coopetitive relations for the company. Hence, 
this is not the question of “why” anymore, but the issue of reality.  
Except answer the question “Why enter coopetitive relationships?” the case provided 
unexpected finding clarifying why among any other South Korean publishers Paco 
chose Cado that cooperated with Tuma, Russian competitor of Paco. It goes beyond the 
purpose of the study but was found valuable and related addition to the research topic, 
hence, it was included in the analysis.  
Firstly, both respondents mentioned that South Korean market had other publishers and 
developers even there were not so much as in Russia. It means that since inception there 
was a choice. Hence, Paco intended to compare South Korean publishers and select the 
one that would offer the more beneficial conditions of cooperation. In reality it turned 
other way. 
“In general we wanted to compare them [Cado and other publisher] in terms of 
offered conditions, simply speaking, who would offer more beneficial terms. 
Furthermore, there are a couple of local SNSs, and compared companies had 
slightly different positions in them… but with the second company there were 
some problems [in obtaining information].“ (Respondent C) 
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Paco was disappointed with unexpected procrastinations and uncertain perspectives in 
negotiation with the second South Korean publisher.  
“To sum up, we had some problems in communication with other Koreans; they 
either did not answer or did it slowly, or something else…“ (Respondent C) 
At the same time, Paco exchanged information with Tuma regarding its experience in 
South Korean market in generally and cooperation with Cado particularly. 
 “By that time when we were already in contact with Cado, our partners [in 
Russian market], or let’s better say… competitors, generally speaking, the 
company that we knew in the market, precisely Tuma, had already experience 
with South Korean publisher. They had been working with them by that moment. 
Tuma have positive experience from their launch and earned money.“  
(Respondent C) 
“Yes, it [Tuma’s experience of cooperation with Cado] played some role [in our 
decision].“ (Respondent A) 
Finally, based on Tuma’s advice Paco looked for information about Cado: 
“There were more variants. But Cado is number one. And they are more certain 
in terms of communication. There was less pointless discussion. You have to work 
with the strong partners.“ (Respondent A) 
Thus, such elements as efficiency evaluation, lack of knowledge combined with a wish 
to use opportunities abroad, roles played in the network, recommendation and 
reputation, lack of sufficient information about other possible partners, and personal 
belief in cooperation with the strong partner defined for Paco the choice of competitor 
for cooperation in building of cross-border value chain. The sequence how the elements 
appeared in Paco’s decision is presented in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Sequence of elements influencing Paco’s decision in favor of cooperation with 
competitor. 
The interesting finding here is that all the elements together narrowed the choice till one 
candidate and pushed Paco to cooperation with Cado.  
“Since the beginning, we tried to compare them, but at the end this [Cado] 
appeared to be the only alive possibility.“ (Respondent C) 
Following the described sequence it is impossible to argue that Paco had a lot of 
freedom and variations in decision-making while entering cooperative relations with 
competitor. The statement that the choice was pre-defined is too rough but it was highly 
affected by surroundings and external influence. The finding is in alignment with the 
position of the business network approach that stated company dependency on other 
actors in the network (Håkansson &  Ford 2002). Paco’s decision was certainly 
influenced by Tuma’s experience. Definitely reputation plays its role in the case as it 
stated in game theory by Hill (1990).  
Furthermore, proactive position is found from Paco’s wish to partner with the strong 
network actor that is correlates with statement expressed by Hertz & Mattson (2004) or 
Osarenkhoe (2010) regarding a possibility to maintain network position with help of 
other actors to capture more value individually. However, the mentioned authors do not 
clarify if such cooperation for position maintenance is sensitive to pure cooperation or 
coopetition with competitor. The benefits from the former are obvious as knowledge 
exchange, connection extension and so on. However, possibility to maintain network 
position with help of competitor is challenging due to high likelihood of opportunism 
from both sides in relationships as they possess complementary knowledge and its 
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transfer may reduce necessity of cooperation but gaining enough confidence to act 
alone. 
 
What and why particular activities are selected for combination of competition and 
cooperation in cross-border value chain?  
From the case explanation in Chapter 5.1.1 it is obvious that extension of value chain 
abroad caused some changes and additions to the usual set of activities. Mainly, 
additions were induced by necessity of localization, i.e. translation and graphics and 
design adaptations. Thus, the company had to decide whether the activities, related to 
localization, are done solely or in cooperation with competitor. In the investigated case 
translation as totally new activity comparing to the home market was passed to the 
publisher, namely outsourced. At the same time design and graphic adaptation was 
conducted in-house however following the recommendations of South Korean partner. 
The respondents explained clearly why it was done in such way. Paco is a small and 
limited in resources company. At the same time Korean language is not commonly used 
and difficult so it was time- and moneyconsuming to acquire own specialist for game 
translation. Additionally, translation is seen as fully detached activity that can be easy 
transferred from own responsibility to partner. 
“We give them special files that contain all text of the game in English (so-called 
localization file). So they translate it. Afterwards we integrate it in the game.“ 
(Respondent C) 
Regarding adaptation of graphics and game play the situation was totally opposite. The 
activities are highly critical for game success as they visualize the game and 
consequently define level of understanding and involvement of players. It is also 
obvious that visualization is highly cultural dependent. Furthermore, the game must 
follow legislative regulations applied in the country of launch. At first glance all this 
issues are complicated for foreign entity and provoke activity outsourcing to the 
experienced foreign partner. However the reality shows the opposite. 
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“It is worthless to let them into details as only we know the game and game play 
particularly… Sometimes… for example, other company launched in Asia, they 
redesigned game heroes to make them looked more like anime-characters 
following advice of the foreign partner. In fact they do nothing in the process of 
game creation but they can give advice or requirements, i.e. delete gambling.“ 
(Respondent C) 
Thus, game design and game graphics are adapted for foreign market in-house but 
cautiously following the advice of the competitor. That is explained with high 
interdependency of three processes of game creation (see Figure 14 and explanation of 
Paco’s value chain in Chapter 5.1.1.). Additionally, projects that already existed in 
Russian market were planned for market launch in South Korea so the localization 
changes were done based on existed stable work team and links inside it. It can be 
assumed that knowledge transfer, that contained internal game interdependencies, was 
found less effective than own carrying of the activity under competitor guidance. This 
finding corresponds fully to the transaction cost approach (Park and Russo, 1996) and 
search of efficiency in direct and transaction costs. However, influencion of the 
competitor advice on the effectiveness of the carried activity goes definitely beyond the 
logic of the approach. Here game theory complements understanding arguing 
cooperation success by mutual interest in the result according to Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger (1995; 1997). This is a clear example where the bigger “pie” is created 
in cooperation to get then bigger piece of it separately. 
The next activity that was influenced by expansion to South Korean market is after-
launch marketing. It was passed to South Korean partner. The respondents reasoned it 
with a number of arguments. 
“Firstly and mainly it is that they are local South Korean partner that knows the 
market. We know neither market, nor people there.“ (Respondent A) 
“They [local company] save a lot of our resources in terms of work with local 
SNS. I mean, they have already all necessary information… how to do better, 
what is the market situation and so on.“ (Respondent C) 
Thus, here the issue of adaptation definitely appears again. After-launch marketing was 
passed to Cado due to significant difference between home and host markets in terms of 
language, customer behavior, legislation and so on. The activity has clear downstream 
character so cooperation with competitor in it on the one hand contradicts to the 
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statements of Bengtsson & Kock 2000, Nalebuff & Brandenburger 1997, on the other 
hand it is partly in line with Porter (1986) as he claimed cooperation with local 
companies in downstream activities without any stress however either these companies 
are competitors or not. 
The same after-launch marketing falls under competitive relationships between Paco 
and Cado. 
“In other words, cooperating with Cado we compete at the same time with their 
other product, and compete with Russian company in South Korea.“ (Respondent 
A) 
“And three the most popular games [in Cado’s portfolio] are from other Russian 
developer Tuma (number 1 in Russia now).“ (Respondent A) 
It was difficult to answer the question why after-launch marketing was selected for 
competition. Generally competition in this activity is natural as it is responsible for 
value exchange and consequently value appropriation (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 
2009). It reflects individual goals of captured value maximization. From game theory 
point of view this is the activity where “pie” is shared (Nalebuff & Brandenburger 
1995). The peculiarity of the case is that competition between all three companies takes 
place internally within Cado’s game portfolio where games developed by Paco, Cado 
and Tuma compete for customer attention and money. Hence, after-launch marketing is 
simultaneously influenced by cooperation and competition.  
The rest activities of value chain were found out of competitive or cooperative 
influence. Moreover they were not considered for cooperation with competitor at all. 
“There are usually no other variants [of doing value chain activities]. The 
publisher cannot do game development and testing. We do testing anyway, there 
is no necessity to pass it for outsource.“ (Respondent C) 
The statement discovers an interesting stream of management logic. It is out of theories 
explaining why companies cooperate or compete but it considers common patterns in 
business as the main guiding principle. It means that in real situations not everything 
can be explained from the position of academic knowledge. The preconceived idea is in 
use often with deep belief in its efficiency. 
70 
The described above findings regarding particular activities of cross-border value chain 
and their involvement in competition and cooperation between competitors are 
visualized in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Elements influencing degree of cooperation and competition in Paco’s cross-
border value chain. 
In total considering division of value chain activities in upstream and downstream the 
results from the case are mixed. One downstream activity, viz after-launch marketing, 
and some upstream activities are involved in cooperation with competitor. At the same 
time, the competition was identified in after-launch marketing activities that are 
downstream. 
Such findings partly contradict to the business network approach that states cooperation 
in upstream activities, i.e. R&D or purchasing, and competition in downstream 
activities, i.e. marketing and sales (Bengtsson & Kock 2000). Additionally, the findings 
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found game theory limited considering only joint “pie” creation in upstream activities 
and its separate appropriation while downstream activities. The case shows that 
common efforts towards value creation continue in downstream activities in form of 
aggregation of all “pies” in one market place, viz. publisher portfolio. It attracts a lot of 
different customers so every “pie” can find own unique customer. In fact, this is logic of 
long tail (Anderson 2004) very typical for internet-business. Here the market and the 
number of customers are so big and growing contemporary that competition is not so 
concentrated so even one publisher can offer games with similar mechanics that will be 
successful.  Furthermore, the confirmation of the transaction cost approach (Hill 1990) 
was found is rational evaluation of transaction costs of knowledge transfer, the activity 
was passed to the competitor responsibility where knowledge was easy-transferable and 
other activity with more complicated knowledge was left in-house and partnership took 
place in form of advisory. 
As it was mentioned in the methodology chapter the delights of the case study in its 
closeness to the reality that gives sometimes unforeseen findings. Among expected 
elements defining degree of cooperation and competition in cross-border value chain, 
viz. lack of knowledge of the foreign market, lack of resources, high risks of own action 
in hostile unknown environment, reputation and so on one statement definitely steps 
aside. 
“Well, it’s obvious! There is no sense to discuss it. There are some activities that 
only we can do, and some activities that can be done only by them.“ (Respondent 
A) 
Often the company does not challenge the convenient truth especially knowing from a 
home competitor that such work order brings profit. The company follows well-
established pattern. Thus, some decisions can be explained form the position of 
different theories, others happen in terms of limited time and uncertain data without  
evaluation of all elements influencing degree of cooperation and coopetition in value 
chain. Then the most efficient way is to follow the existing practice that has been 
proved to be successful. 
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5.2.2. Case 2 
Why does the company enter coopetitive relations when expanding activities abroad?  
As Paco from case 1 Nap also expands activities abroad willingly. However in this case 
it is caused by search for suppliers as the products offered by Nap in Russian market is 
not manufactured in Russia. Thus, Nap contemporary looks for suppliers abroad 
fulfilling a wish of company development and growth.  
“We need to refresh assortment contemporary. If we do not renew the assortment, 
we will begin dying out. Our clients... if we treat them good, and it happens with 
them very often… They come and ask: “What’s new you have?”  (Respondent D) 
In Russian market Nap carries pure role of wholesaler so it is possible to have 
unambiguous cooperative vertical relationships with suppliers. However the current 
case is complicated with the fact that Vect, Nap’s supplier, had also own distribution 
provided by Bogu in Russian market. Consequently, Vect competed with own products 
with Nap through Bogu in Russian market. But Nap did not look for such double 
cooperative-competitive relationship on purpose. 
Nap understood the complexity of the situation since the beginning. The choice was 
based on some previous data about profitability and demand of Vect’s  products. 
“At the beginning we bought some Vect’s products [from old distributor], 
supplied it to retail and understood that the product was interesting.“ 
(Respondent D) 
“We understood that the Vect’s product is fully matched to our retailing concept. 
Adding it to the assortment was the right step towards the vision we followed.“ 
(Respondent B) 
In general, Nap was ready to cooperate with Russian official distributor of Vect to avoid 
conflict situation when two marketing channels serve one market (Gabrielsson, 
Kirpalani & Luostarinen 2002), however there was a number of reasons that alienated 
Nap from such decision. Firstly, the new official distributor Bogu had not been in full 
operation yet. There were still some establishing procedures. Then temporal physical 
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absence of the distributor was supplemented with individual perception of Nap’s 
managers. 
“When we knew who was the partner [Vect’s distributor], we were very 
disappointed as we had had experience of cooperation with that company, and the 
experience was mournfull.“ (Respondent D) 
Being unsatisfied with what they had Nap’s managers took a proactive position 
establishing communication with Vect. Nap’s offer clarified to Vect that they have 
different goals in Russian market. 
“We made to Vect an offer that was interesting to them and they did not want to 
decline it. The essence of the offer was that we took the assortment that was not 
handled by the official distributor… So we supplied directly from the 
manufacturer the products that were not interesting for the other company.“  
(Respondent B) 
Thus, Nap convinced Vect that they and Bogu could simultaneously co-exist. Since the 
beginning the confrontation in market and consequently the tension in competition did 
not look strong due to goals divergence. Such explanation of coopetition possibility is in 
agreement with Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco (2004). 
The interesting fact is that according to the business network approach Nap was 
supposed to be pushed to cooperation with Bogu to avoid conflicts and tensions in the 
network (Håkansson & Snehota 1995) while it was not exactly what Nap wanted. 
Therefore, the model of coopetitive relationships answered better to Nap’s own 
interests. Such finding contradicts the business network approach where cooperation 
aims conflict mitigation (Bengtsson & Kock 1999). However, it is obvious that Nap did 
not look for conflict but more favorable conditions of doing business. Game theory 
gives better explanation in this case. Here company’s individual wish of profit definitely 
bypassed convenient networking imposed externally and Nap intended to change the 
game as it is offered by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995). The sequence of decision 
making process in favour of cooperation with competitor is visualized in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20. Sequence of elements influencing Nap’s decision in favor of cooperation 
with competitor. 
Highlighting Nap’s proactive approach in the case it is still worth to mention that 
cooperation with Vect was not such a necessity as it was in case 1: 
“There was no such vital necessity… We could not complement this particular 
product, but business would survive without it. In other words we could easily 
survive without Vect’s product, but it was more interesting with it.“ (Respondent 
D) 
“It is obvious that our clients are more interested to order when the wide range of 
products is offered by the wholesaler.“ (Respondent D) 
Hence, in this case embedment in coopetitive relation did not have survival character 
but vice versa it was a free will with signs of network position maintenance as it is 
described by Håkansson & Ford (2002), Gnyawali and Madhaven (2006) and Bengtsson 
& Kock (1999).  
 
What and why particular activities are selected for combination of competition and 
cooperation in cross-border value chain?  
In this case it is not correct to consider that creation of cross-border value chain create 
new activities to the existing ones. In reality it expands responsibility of Nap comparing 
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to cooperation with home distributors according to the concept of the holistic value 
chain applied for the current study. At the same time, such responsibility expansion 
towards upstream activities was not the first experience for Nap as by that time the 
company had already suppliers abroad.  The decision in favor of cooperation with the 
foreign manufacturer-supplier was based on inability to get desired product from any 
Russian supplier. Additionally it was also pushed by the wish to build more effective 
logistics system of delivery from Europe.  
“…we had better logistics channels… we sent full container of mixed consignment 
that we filled with other our orders from Italy, Germany… In total, in my opinion, 
we got the same costs [as Bogu with lower price as distributor]. So we could 
compete with them [Bogu].“ (Respondent D). 
Thus, cooperation with the foreign supplier provided Nap with flexibility in building of 
own supply chain, independency of distributor delivery schedule and increased control 
of the operations and product flow. Such elements influencing decision in favor of 
coopetition in upstream activities are in alignment with the logic of the transaction cost 
approach in Hill (1990). They aim supply chain optimization and hierarchy costs 
minimizations via utilization of own resources and knowledge. 
The foreign manufacturer-supplier participated in the value chain activities in terms of 
cooperation only in production side.  
“Mostly we work with all our suppliers/manufacturers in such way. We arrange 
everything [delivery, localization, promotion and so on] by ourselves… This is 
their way of work!“ (Respondent C) 
There is nothing extraordinary, Nap and Vect followed the common pattern accepted in 
the industry. Also Vect did not have necessity to extend cooperation in other activities. 
“They [Vect] are not classic vendor like Samsung, for example, that is not able to 
sale anything unless distributors and retailers. They [Vect] will sale anyway.“ 
(Respondent D) 
It is obvious that Vect is satisfied with its network position and acts passively answering 
to external request and configure own relationships in a way that require minimum 
effort for maintenance.   
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The case may not have had an issue of coopetition and would have been an example of 
ordinary supplier-buyer cooperative relationships unless Vect had had other marketing 
channel to Russian market. Thus, the competition took place in the wholesale supply 
when Nap and Bogu tried to serve the same customers, viz. retailers of toy skill in 
Russia. The activity is downstream. At the beginning it was settled between Nap and 
Vect that the former would supply products only in the network of the parent company. 
“We positioned ourselves as we ordered the products [from Vect] for our parent 
company, for its retail as we could not buy the product from the distributor Bogu. 
However, if we have possibility to sell by wholesale, we will not lose it.“ 
(Respondent C) 
Thus, coopetition appeared in relationships between Nap and Vect. The elements 
influenced selection of cooperative and competitive relationships are summarized in 
Figure 21. 
To sum up, this case is seen as classic interpretations of distribution coopetition and 
cooperation in value chain activities. Cooperation in upstream activities and competition 
in downstream ones confirms assumptions of Bengtsson & Kock 2000 from the 
business network approach. Additionally some level of assumptions from Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger (1995; 1997) about “pie” creation and appropriation can be detected in 
the case either. At least it is obvious for Vect as such cooperation brings more its 
products to Russian market. However, the wish to serve bigger market together (Nap 
and Bogu) was not proved from the interviews. On the contrary, Nap expressed an 
inclination to take away distribution from Bogu. Thus, it can be concluded that 
coopetition was optimum way of relationships in the current situation but it was not the 
most desired taking the long-term perspective. 
Such findings are obvious from the behavior expressed by Nap in the development of 
relationships. Even considering favorable conditions of supply Nap could not avoid lure 
of opportunism. The competition became stronger, the relationships with Vect became 
misbalanced. The managers of Nap considered that Bogu complained to Vect about the 
conflict of interests and agreement infringement.  
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“But for him [Vect’s owner], I suppose, things like pledged word and so on are 
meant a lot. And his position is understandable. Finally, that company [Bogu], in 
my opinion, visited him. But we have not yet.“ (Respondent C) 
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Figure 21. Elements influencing degree of cooperation and competition in Nap’s cross-
border value chain. 
Thus, Vect did not favor competition wishing “kids friendship” (Respondent C) or 
cooperative relationships of companies dealing with Vect’s products in one particular 
country. Unfortunately, there was no possibility to discover original reasons but 
managers of Nap considered that:  
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“The matter is that they [Vect] are already experienced, they have already 
shops… So we were for them as extra income but not the only sale possibility.“  
(Respondent C) 
“… they [Vect] were not very interested to work with more than one client in one 
particular country.“ (Respondent D) 
“Consequently they [Vect] would have fewer expenses for communication; they 
would have one partner that provides with everything.“ (Respondent D) 
At the time period when the last interview took place the relationships between Nap and 
Vect were put on hold; the relationships between Nap and Bogu enter the phase of re-
creation but the final layout was not certain yet 
In total the case is interesting in such terms that the company provoked coopetitive 
relations switched the situation from the pure cooperation with the distributor. It is very 
close to propositions done by Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1995) regarding changing 
the game for both party benefits. However, as opposed to the mentioned authors the 
relationships were not stable, the coopetition increased, then competitive relationships 
as inconvenient element was fully stopped switched to compulsory cooperation in 
downstream activities. These finding goes beyond the research purpose but it is 
interesting and related in terms of elements influencing such decision-making. The 
results clearly show that wish of conflict minimization guided Vect to mitigate 
competitive relationships between the official distributor and a good partner. 
Consequently it questions applicability of game theory or the transaction cost approach 
to the cases where profit is not the main target of companies embedded in coopetitive 
relationships.  
Further, the comparison of both cases is presented. It summarizes and highlight 
similarities and differences discovered during the analysis. 
 
5.3. Cross comparison 
Firstly, there is general overlook at the companies (see also Table 3). They both are 
small young start-ups targeting profit maximization through contemporary search for 
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growth.  The companies operate in different industries but in broader perspective they 
can be seen as part of the entertainment business. The products they provide can be 
perceived generally as games but in case of Nap the product is physical, and in case of 
Paco it is virtual and located online in Internet. Furthermore, the companies use 
different business models, Paco works in Freemium and Nap functions in classical 
wholesale-retail model. The companies are based in Russia representing big market for 
both industries; still Paco and Nap are open for cooperation and proactively look for 
partners in foreign markets. The primary reason for foreign expansion is search for new 
sources of profit, but secondary reasons are different due to companies’ positions in the 
holistic value chain. In-house activities of Paco are located mostly before the point of 
completed product and they are upstream. So Paco looks for partners in downstream 
activities. Nap’s in-house activities are downstream; consequently its target for 
partnership is suppliers and manufacturers providing upstream activities.  In spite of 
these “activity location” differences, the issue of competition appeared in downstream 
activities in both cases.  
Table 3. Similarities and differences in company profiles 
Comparison criteria Similarities Differences 
Paco / Case 1 Nap / Case 1 
General  small, young  
 proactive in 
expansion 
 home base in 
Russia 
  
Target profit maximization 
via constant growth 
  
Industry entertainment online social games skill toy 
Business model  freemium wholesale-retail 
Position in holistic 
value chain 
 upstream downstream 
Source of growth  new markets new suppliers 
Respondents company co-owners   
Coopetitive modes  cooperation in 
upstream 
activities 
 competition in 
downstream 
activities 
cooperation in 
upstream activities 
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Moreover, in both cases the co-founders were interviewed. All respondents claimed that 
they were involved in the cases directly. Hence, it can be assumed that they have similar 
level of knowledge about the case situation as well as power to decide. 
The analysis discovered the common elements that pushed companies to cooperation 
(see also Table 4). They are lack of resources and knowledge (especially in case 1) and 
also search proactively for business expansion. The latter appeared as way of own 
market position maintenance to grow profit and strengthen competitive advantage, 
partly as search for fame (in case1). The survival element, when cooperation with 
competitor takes place to rescue the business, was declined. However, in case 1 some 
sense of urgency was found when narrowing the scope only within South Korean 
market. In case 2 the urgency lied in lack of Russian suppliers of particular desired 
products. Logically from company positions in the holistic value chain the last element 
explains cooperation with competitors in different types of activities: upstream in case 2 
and downstream in case 1. Generally it supplements the lack of knowledge and 
resources and pushes companies to cooperation in activities that they are not specialized 
in. 
Additional element of cooperation can be seen in a wish of both companies use their 
own resources more effectively. In case 1 the same team of developers adapted the 
existing game for South Korean market. In case 2 new product flow was incorporated in 
existing supply chain from Europe to Russia. As a result the products for customer in 
case 1 and 2 were delivered in more effective way with minimized costs and 
consequently maximized profit and kept competitive advantage. 
The most noticeable element in favor of competition is conflict infusion. However, in 
both cases it did not have critical and destructive character. According to Bengtsson and 
Kock (1999) it must exist to a certain extent unless the business network is effective. 
Hence, the conflict of games was in Cado’s portfolio and it was manageable as it was 
under the control of one entity. Moreover, Cado grows game portfolio on purpose and 
consequently grows the conflict. In case 2 conflict was manageable till Nap extended 
business to Bogu’s competitive domain. In fact, the element entailed conflict growth 
was Nap’s opportunism. As a result fragile balance between cooperation and 
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competition was forcedly switched to cooperation. Here Vect keeps strategy of conflict 
avoidance and look for harmony.  
In general, the coopetition model of joint “pie” creation and its separate appropriation 
afterwards (Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1995; 1997) can be found in both cases. 
However, in case 1 applying “long tail” approach it is sustainable and in case 2 it leaded 
to competitor domain infringement and later to dissolution. 
Finally, in both cases the compliance with the common pattern of doing business was 
discovered. There were only a number of activities dedicated to cooperation or 
competition, the rest ones were kept in-house and had neutral character. Such decision 
often did not have explanation except common wisdom and compliance with previous 
experience and successful practices.  
Table 4. Comparison of elements influencing coopetitive modes in case 1 & 2. 
Coopetitive 
modes 
Similar elements Different elements 
Case 1 Case 2 
Cooperation in 
upstream 
activities 
 cost efficiency 
 lack of resources 
 position 
maintenance 
 common pattern 
 knowledge 
transfer 
 lack of knowledge 
 wish to grow 
 sense of urgency 
Competition in 
downstream 
activities 
  common patter 
  essential element 
for network 
existence 
 opportunism 
  wish to grow 
  goal divergence 
Cooperation in 
downstream 
activities 
  sense of urgency 
 wish to grow 
 lack of knowledge 
for adaptation 
 risk of failure 
 position 
maintenance 
 recommendation 
 access to partner 
connections 
 common pattern 
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It is clearly noticeable from the table that despite appearance of similar coopetitive 
modes in both cases elements influenced choice of cooperation or competition in value 
chain activities mostly vary between cases. It is especially applicable for competition in 
downstream activities. Such difference can be explained by different positions of the 
companies in the holistic value chain. Thus, in case 1 competition was not direct for 
Paco and took place solely in marketing activities of South Korean partner. In fact Paco 
did not have possibility for opportunism. The second cause for such differentiation can 
be found in business areas and applied business models. Online business operating in 
Freemium provokes gathering as many customers as possible without being affected by 
scarcity of resources (i.e. warehouse space for product stock). Hence, the market for 
online games does not suffer from competition so much because the more games, the 
better possibility that every customer finds the game according to own taste and 
preferences. The same rules cannot be applied to physical business especially for B-2-B 
like in case 2. There number of customers is limited, does not grow so quickly so the 
lure of opportunism to extend business in competitor’s domain is stronger. 
Second interesting observation from the comparison of the elements is that in different 
cases the same elements influenced choice differently. For example, wish to grow 
influenced choice of competition in downstream activities in case 2 and cooperation in 
downstream activities in case 1. It can be explained with the help of different theoretical 
approaches. In case 1 wish of grow caused cooperation due to lack of own resources and 
knowledge for such grow that is in line with the business network approach. In case 2 
wish of grow could be explained by the transaction cost theory when secure bonds in 
cooperation was not strong enough to resist to opportunism. 
To sum up the comparison uncover mixed results in terms of elements distribution 
influencing coopetitive modes. However, on the other hand it showed value of 
theoretical approach fusion that complement each other explaining different and even 
similar elements from different perspectives.  
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2.1. Summary 
The previous chapters represent a set of elements that was discovered from the 
empirical study as influencing degree of cooperation and competition in cross-border 
value chain activities. However, in terms of the current work it is worth to allocate the 
identified elements under the theoretical approaches to understand better their nature 
and origins of their appearance. 
For facilitation of the following explanation all elements were grouped depending on 
influenced coopetitive mode and located in the modified theoretical framework from 
Chapter 3.4. It was discovered that all the approaches participated more or less in 
formation of all three groups of the elements influencing different coopetitive modes. 
Graphic interpretation can be found in Figure 22.  
The business network approach was found as the most fruitful in explanation of the 
elements. However, the elements come from it are much different. Firstly, as it was 
proposed before (see chapter 3.1.) the business network approach did not revealed any 
elements influencing modes where competition took place that is in line with core 
assumptions about the approach (Håkansson & Snehota 1995). However, influence of 
elements was discovered on both downstream and upstream activities.  Furthermore, the 
identified elements from the business network approach can be grouped in two streams 
caused by unavoidable company embedment in the network and voluntary search for 
company prosperity. The former were recommendations, access to partner connections, 
knowledge transfer, acquisition of missing resources or sense of urgency that is in line 
with findings of Chetty and Wilson (2003). Moreover, element of position maintenance 
is also associated with the business network approach (Oserenkhoe 2010) but explained 
more company proactive position and a wish to get the more beneficial place in the 
network with the help of competitor. Such fusion of reactive and proactive elements in 
one case handling by the company simultaneously is new for the business network 
approach. 
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Figure 22. The theoretical framework modified after findings from the empirical study. 
Then game theory justified the elements in all three investigated coopetitive modes. 
Interestingly one particular element, viz. a wish to grow, was caused by game theory but 
influenced different coopetitive modes. It is clear that it appeared from desire of profit 
gain aligned with Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2009) when cooperation with 
competitors take place to increase the “pie” and get bigger market share afterwards. As 
unexpected and new finding it is worth to highlight that this element guided decisions 
for coopetition in all types of modes however during practical implementation it was 
supported by other elements specified for every type of modes. Thus, in competition in 
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downstream activities it was opportunism that pushed the company towards a 
competitor domain. In coopetition in downstream and upstream activities it can be 
coupled with position maintenance to get bigger market share. In all three cases wish of 
grow coupled with other element explained by the approach other than game theory. 
Here the vitality of approaches fusion is seen.  Being considered in pairs elements find 
better explanations of decision making. 
Finally, the transaction cost approach also appears in elements for all three discovered 
coopetitive modes. However, its contribution is relatively modest in terms of number of 
elements. Such finding does not have explanation and support or contradiction from 
literature because the applied fusion of researches has not been used before. In general it 
can be concluded that the logic of the approach brings rationality in the final decision 
evaluating costs of carrying an activity in-house against outsource and costs of gains 
from opportunistic behavior.   
The respondents’ explanations of the elements gave an opportunity to allocate some of 
them under two approaches simultaneously, viz. position maintenance and 
recommendation. They can be explained simultaneously by the business network 
approach (see above) and by game theory. The latter is applied in repeated games and 
claims that players with better reputation get easier in cooperative agreements (Hill 
1990). Position maintenance through the lenses of game theory is a change game 
strategy, when with a wish of better own position in the market the player cooperate 
with the competitor and change its position for better either. 
Finally, the empirical study revealed an element that does not fall under explanation of 
any theory applied for this work. It is a common pattern when a company follows the 
way that was already proved to be successful from own experience or from market 
intelligence.  
To sum up, the findings disclosure catholicity of elements influencing coopetitive 
modes in cross-border value chain. However applying the fusion of the theoretical 
approaches almost all of them can be explained and even show the areas where the 
approaches intersect.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The current study in area of strategic management concentrated on issues of coopetition. 
Precisely, it investigates elements that define degree of cooperation and competition in 
cross-border value chain. Theoretical part consisted of two parts observing core 
concepts, viz. the value chain and coopetition. The former was focused on aggregative 
upstream and downstream activities. The latter was narrowed to definition of coopetive 
modes, that mean presence or absence of cooperative and/or competitive relationships in 
value chain activities. Further, coopetition modes were examined through the lenses of 
three theoretical approaches, viz  business network approach, game theory and the 
transaction cost approach, that are often applied for the concept. Literature observation 
on theoretical approaches helped to identify preliminary theoretical framework of 
elements that affect coopetitive modes. Later it was applied for the empirical part of the 
study with the purpose to discover particular elements and influenced coopetitive 
modes. The empirical study was done through case studies based on qualitative 
technique of analysis. Two case studies were selected as sources of information.  After 
the analysis  the original theoretical framework was revised and improved as the 
findings uncovered ambiguous nature of elements that can be caused by more than one 
theoretical approach and can affect more than one coopetitive mode. 
Further, implications of the study for research and practice are presented. Finally the 
paper is closed with limitations of the study and suggestions for further research. 
 
6.1. Implications for research 
The study uncovered variety of elements influencing degree of coopetition in cross-
border value chain. All of them except one were classified under one or more existing 
theoretical approaches. In this approach fusion is seen the main contribution of the 
study, it shows that firstly, approaches are mostly complementary to each other and 
their simultaneous application provided broader perspective on identification and 
87 
explanation of elements influencing coopetitive modes. Additionally, Russian context of 
the empirical part is novel for coopetition studies and obviously requires further 
investigations. 
The current research is a part of intensively developing managerial studies dedicated to 
the simultaneous co-existence of competition and cooperation in relationships between 
companies. The focus of the research is narrowed with area of value chain activities and 
particular cooperative, competitive or coopetitive relationships in them. The study 
appears to be in the middle between two broad research streams. One is dedicated to the 
cooperative and competitive relationships applied to the company as a whole entity 
(Bengtsson & Kock 2000; Kock et al. 2010; Gimeno 2004; Lado et al. 1997). The other 
stream focuses on particular value chain activities (Arranz & Arroyabe 2008; Mention 
2011; Kotzab and Teller 2003; Rusko 2011). Thus, the finding from the current study 
could be applied to develop both streams. In case of deeper investigation of coopetition 
and particular value chain activities (i.e.R&D, logistics, marketing) the results of the 
study can be used partly, narrowing the selection of findings only with activities that are 
included in the scope of new research. In case of holistic approach of coopetitive 
relationships between companies the discovered elements can be aggregated and used 
all together. 
Then in the studies about coopetition there are two perception of coopetition can be 
found. The first one is direct where competition and cooperation between companies 
appeared without any intermediary (Kock et al. 2010; Hertz & Mattsson 2004; Dong-
Wook 2003). The second group of studies investigates cases of indirect coopetition 
when the units of study are neither direct competitors, nor direct partners, intermediary 
or intermediaries are in between playing aggregative role (Schiavone & Simoni 2011; 
Osarenkhoe 2010). The current study belongs to the mixed type as coopetition took 
place both direсtly (Case 1) and indirectly (Case 1 and 2). Due to lack of similar studies 
it is difficult to define if such mix influenced the discovered elements. However, 
findings can be used separately, for example, only from the case 2 with pure indirect 
coopetition.  
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Finally, the cases were especially selected with the availability of the 
internationalization aspect. Since the beginning the study targeted to contribute to the 
research stream where coopetition takes place between foreign companies or in foreign 
markets (Kock et al. 2010; Luo 2007; Chetty & Wilson 2003) with a special stress on 
international element in form of cultural, marketing or any other peculiarities. However, 
during the literature review it was found that though some studies dedicated to 
coopetitive relationships did not highlight international aspects, they contained it that 
was obvious from the description (Gimeno 2004; Hertz & Mattsson 2004; Bonel & 
Rocco 2007). Hence, it could be concluded that the current study could contribute to 
such undefined researches. Still as the element of cross-cultural adaptation was found 
strong especially in case 1 it may be challenging to pick unambiguously elements that 
are universal and can be used in further studies without international aspect and 
elements that are specific for cases of coopetition in international environment. 
 
6.2. Implications for practice 
Continuing the line of previous studies in coopetition the current work confirmed once 
again inevitability and vitality of the phenomenon. For the practitioners it means one 
more tool in the arsenal of strategies that strengthen company’s competitive advantage. 
The main contribution of the study is that it can be used for analysis of coopetitive 
relationship establishment. Its importance is seen not only in analysis of the elements 
influencing company internal decision making process while starting relationships with 
competitors but for analysis of competitors and external environment. Competitor’s way 
of thinking is a black box however its understanding is crucial for decision making. 
Thus, identification of elements pushing a competitor to cooperation may help to 
uncover whether it is a wish of change the game to win-win situation or a ruse for 
opportunistic behaviour. 
At the same time, the findings from the study show benefits from company proactive 
position in the network. The case companies won from extended communication and 
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further cooperation with the competitors. They looked proactively for foreign expansion 
even to hostile and unknown markets. They tried to maintain own network position with 
help of competitors and influence the external environment especially in case 2. 
Accordingly, they got more beneficial conditions of work. It is essentially that such 
proactive way of behavior does not require being totally innovative in company 
strategy. It is enough sometimes to analyze existing patterns and gathered information. 
Finally, it was discovered that even knowledge of all possible elements influencing own 
decision making or decision making of competitors do not allow frequently to act in the 
most efficient way. 
 
6.3. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Firstly, the list of defined elements cannot be seen as comprehensive due to limitation of 
time and information access. It can be proposed that range of discovered elements 
would be broader if it had been a possibility to contact all parties of the coopetitive 
relationships in both cases. Furthermore, the presented elements have perceptional 
nature. It means, that even confirmed from different informants they are subjective as 
co-owners have influence to each other in daily communication. Thus, further studies 
can target identification of the comprehensive list of elements influencing degree of 
cooperation and competition in cross-border value chain through exhaustive interviews 
with all the participants in coopetitive relations and generalization of the study 
regarding elements can be done through extensive survey. 
Then the lack of narrow classification of the elements can be seen as a limitation as such 
grouping would allow to make conclusions that would be better for generalization. The 
future research can focus on identification a common basis for grouping the elements in 
more universal clusters and investigating their relationships with the theoretical 
approaches. 
Further, the study is limited with the focus only on Russian companies as the main 
participants. Considering cultural differences and peculiarities of doing business 
90 
affected by the long period of planned economy, the results of the study can be 
challenged in application for cases in other countries. Thus, to define universal elements 
and country specific ones further studies can replicate the offered framework in 
countries and markets other than Russia. It is also a fruitful direction of research to 
conduct studies aiming comparisons of companies participating in coopetitive 
relationships in different countries. 
The next limitation is that the companies were not first-movers that pioneered in the 
coopetitive relationships. It can be proposed that such “follower” effect may have 
reduced elements influencing establishment of coopetitive relationships while foreign 
expansion. Some elements can be eliminated due to unaccountable following of the 
common convenient pattern. Hence, the future research could target comparison of 
elements considered by the first-movers and followers. 
The study took the cases where not all companies-participants have different activities 
in home market and the market/s of competitors. The companies are integrated in the 
competitor value chain (i.e. Cado in Paco’s value chain and Vect in Nap’s one) but there 
is absence of the opposite integration. Therefore, the additional elements can be 
discovered in future research that investigates cases of coopetition in mixed value 
chains where activities of both or more companies are conducted in two or more 
markets of the companies embedded in coopetitive relationships. 
Finally, discontinuous measure (absence or presence) that is used for degree of 
cooperative and competitive relationships limits the study in terms of senility to 
elements influence. Hence, continuous approach of degree of cooperation and 
competition in relationships between two companies is seen fruitful for future studies to 
allocate influencing elements more accurate.  
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APPENDIX 1. Industry profiles 
Case 1 – social game industry in South Korea 
Social game industry is a part of big entertainment industry but it is young as started its 
development with spreading of applications in social networking service (SNS). In 
South Korea it happened in 2009-2010 (Pyo 2010). At the same time in 2009 the boost 
of applications for SNS happened in Russia (Fadeev 2011).   
The publishers, developers and SNS owners play the main roles in the market. It is 
possible to combine all three roles in one entity but more common situation when in one 
country there are a limited number of big social networks (2-4) and significant amount 
of publishers and developers. Combination of developer-publisher role in one entity can 
be seen more frequent as, for example, in the case study.    
The companies that develop and publish game applications use Freemieum business 
model (Ghosh 2010) and “long tail” approach (Anderson 2004). In other words, it 
means that the game is distributed free-of-charge and any user plays it without 
payments. However, the players have to pay to speed up game events or activate 
optional features. The number of players paying in the social games varies in different 
countries but it is in average 3-5% of total active players (Fadeev 2011). Thus, the scale 
is a key element of profitability, and game recoupment depends on how many people 
are attracted to the game by the marketing campaign. The main customers are students 
and house-wives, so-called “light gamers”, visiting social network services sporadically 
and shortly during the day.  
South Korea has high level of Internet penetration (80,2%) and pioneered in SNS 
(Burson-Marsteller 2011, SK Communications, 2008). So local SNS providers Nate 
with the most popular SNS CyWorld, Naver and Daum keep strong market positions 
and such world known companies as Facebook and Google struggle behind. It is 
explained by high requirements to online service localization appearing from language 
and legislation prerequisites. However, in 2010-2011 only 28% of Internet users 
exploited actively SNSs, and only 14% of CyWorld users experienced application 
(comparing with 70% of Facebook users) (Burson-Marsteller, 2011, GlobalWebIndex, 
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2011, Sung-Hwan 2010). Thus, local and international application developers and 
publishers see a promising pool for active penetration. 
Considering developers and publishers in Korea it is worth to mention that local 
publishers feel more comfortable with language and legislation. But they actively attract 
foreign developers for cooperation (SK Communications 2011). 
 
Case 2 – skill toy industry in Russia 
The skill toy industry is a part of bigger entertainment industry while perceiving the 
latter in the broader context of ways to spend spare time. The skill toy is dedicated to 
develop a particular skill how to handle the toy and make a number of tricks with it. 
However, being in the crossroads of active entertainment and sport the skill toy has not 
get mass popularity and occupies small specific niches in the market. The most famous 
examples of the skill toys are yo-yo, Frisbee flying disc, astrojex, Waboba bouncing 
ball. Many names of skill toys are used now uncapitalized but they are registered 
trademarks of companies-manufacturers. It happened because the invented products 
were novel and authentically original, so their trademarks became often commonly used 
as product names. 
Most of the products target teenagers and youths in age 15-30 year old. At the same 
time skill toy is associated with sub-cultures and popularized in group of people. The 
strong feeling of belonging to the group creates through necessity of experience 
exchange to develop own skill of skill toy tricks. Thus, the skill toy may act as a 
socialization catalyst.  
The main manufacturing companies are from Europe and the USA; however, their 
production facilities may be located in Asian countries due to optimization of cost 
efficiency on the global scale. Their products are unique and innovative, protected by 
patents and trademarks. Thus, these assets allow manufacturers to distribute their output 
worldwide working with authorized dealers, wholesalers and retailers in different 
countries. 
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The Russian skill toy market is young and started with yo-yo in 2000th. It is very 
fragmented and largely supported by amateurs, whose first target is not to get profit but 
to promote the skill toy itself. However, nowadays the professional wholesalers like the 
companies mentioned in the case enter the market; their primary target is profitable 
business. It shakes the market and makes amateurs to cooperate with each other 
broadening the assortment and decreasing prices. 
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APPENDIX 2. Interview guide 
1. General Information (5-10 min) 
 Company profile/Story 
 Date of foundation 
 Turnover 
 Number of employees 
 Geography 
2. Value chain in brief (10-15 min) 
3. Industry in coopiting market, Market segment and place of the company (10-15 min) 
 Competition in industry 
 Cooperation in industry 
4. Internationalization / foreign expansion and the case (15-20 min) 
 Why internationalization (wishes)? How did it affect value chain?   
 When did the decision come?  
Supportive questions: How was it? Who initiated process? (internal managerial 
wish, customer, competitor, legislation changes etc.) Which activity? Decision 
process? Operational process? Dedicated staff? 
 Reactive/Proactive position 
5. Partner selection – coopetition (15-20 min) 
 Why competitor? What are the tensions? What are the benefits? 
 What activities of value chain do you compete and/or cooperate with the 
partner? 
 What are the necessities in internationalization? How did it affect value chain?   
 What are the risks in internationalization? How did it affect value chain?   
